The Exemption Provision of the Civil Aeronautics Act: The Problems Inherent in the Exercise of Pure Administrative Power by Pilson, Neal
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 29 | Issue 4 Article 2
1963
The Exemption Provision of the Civil Aeronautics
Act: The Problems Inherent in the Exercise of Pure
Administrative Power
Neal Pilson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neal Pilson, The Exemption Provision of the Civil Aeronautics Act: The Problems Inherent in the Exercise of Pure Administrative Power, 29 J.
Air L. & Com. 255 (1963)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol29/iss4/2
THE EXEMPTION PROVISION OF
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT:
THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE EXERCISE
OF "PURE" ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
By NEAL PILSONt
I. INTRODUCTION
T IS a singular statutory provision which can mirror many of the ills,
complaints and criticisms of the administrative process. Problems of
delegation and those of procedural due process rarely find root in the
same legislative enactment. Accordingly, the exemption provision of the
Civil Aeronautics Act must be classified as a unique section which raises
classical problems in the field of administrative law. The three critical ele-
ments of the Act's exemption power (speed of administration, broad use
of discretion, and continued administrative supervision) correspond very
closely to the fundamental concepts which underlie the theory of admin-
istrative power. Indeed, the exemption powers exercised by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board are perhaps the purest form of administrative authority em-
ployed by a government agency.
The study of the powers delegated to the Board under the exemption
provision and the manner by which the Board has exercised these powers
is a study in miniature of the administrative process itself. The Civil Aero-
nautics Board was created in the mature years of the New Deal to represent
the ideal in administrative law-combining the regulatory, the promo-
tional, and the adjudicatory functions of the three branches of govern-
ment into one body, capable of exercising all or any of these powers when-
ever it deemed the public interest so required.
Generally, the enabling statute which creates such a body rather care-
fully delimits the agency's functions according to the traditional separation
of powers. Rarely are the three branches of government reflected in one
particular section of the Act.
This paper studies the exemption provision from two perspectives:
(1) from the question of delegation of power and (2) from the related
viewpoint of administrative employment of power. Discussed first is the
relation of the exemption provision to the entire statute of which it is an
integral part; then the scope of the exemption power is assessed, and finally
the unique nature of the provision is compared to other exemption pro-
visions in other regulatory schemes.
The delegation question which is expressed in terms of exactly how
much power was granted to the CAB under the exemption provision serves
to introduce the primary issue to be discussed by this paper, i.e., Board
procedures and practices in administering the exemption authority.
It is a necessary prolog of the discussion of the exemption provision to
" B.A., Hamilton College; LL.B., Yale University.
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define the conventional terms of right and privilege. This is necessary to
ascertain which procedural problem is of principal importance. Not sur-
prisingly, the requirement of a hearing will play the critical role in the
ensuing analysis, for it is this requirement which counterbalances the
original broad delegation of power to the CAB to exempt and to control
exemption. The actual practices of the Board and the judicial reaction to
these procedures compose the bulk of the discussion. While a hearing need
not precede the granting or the denial of an application for an exemption,
this report urges that the hearing requirement subsequently must be im-
posed wherever adjudicative facts are in dispute. The classic conflict be-
tween the administrative pressure to regulate effectively and the eviden-
tiary hearing is evident when the Board acts to modify or terminate an
exemption. The unique scope and character of the Board's exemption
authority permeates every level of analysis, for the Board's principal argu-
ment against the requirement of a hearing is that the Board has broad
power under the exemption provision. Therefore, a carrier is merely ex-
ercising a privilege when it operates under or is granted an exemption,
thus the carrier is not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing when the privi-
lege is altered or terminated. Conceding that an exemption is a privilege
when granted, this paper makes the difficult argument that use of the ex-
emption authority can convert that privilege into a right which cannot
be terminated absent an evidentiary hearing on the adjudicative facts in
dispute.
II. SECTION 416 IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ACT OF 1938
A. Scope Of The Act
During the five year period preceding the enactment of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act, the infant air transportation industry in the United States
was faced with economic difficulties which seriously threatened its growth
and development. It was possible for anyone to enter the business of air
transportation and to compete for passenger and cargo traffic. Carriers,
anxious to obtain routes or to maintain or extend routes they had de-
veloped, after 1934 bid competitively for air mail contracts with little or
no regard for the costs involved.' Under the conditions then existing, few
carriers were able to make a profit and most suffered severe losses. The
financial strength of the carriers deteriorated and the credit position of
the entire industry was seriously impaired.
In this setting, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
The Act's legislative history clearly indicates that the primary objectives
of the economic regulatory powers vested in the Board were the establish-
ment of security of route as a basis for sound and orderly development
and the elimination of the unrestricted and cutthroat competition which
had brought the industry to its precarious condition.a The Act was con-
sidered the ultimate in administrative legislation, for it conferred upon the
Civil Aeronautics Board greater power and wider discretion than ever be-
'For a comprehensive analysis of the factors which led to the passage of the Civil Aeronautics
Act, see Rhyne, Civil Aeronautics Act, Annotated 1-70 (1939).
2 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. 5
1301-1542 (1958)).
aSee 83 Cong. Rec. 6407 (1938). See generally CAB v. Delta Airlines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961).
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fore delegated to an administrative agency.' The scope of this power was
set forth in Section 2 of the Act,' which granted the Board wide latitude
to promote and develop a sound transportation system in the national
interest.
The Supreme Court has found no indication that the Congress either
entertained or fostered the narrow concept that air-borne commerce was
a mere outgrowth or overgrowth of surface-bound transport. "Legally, as
well as literally, air commerce, whether at home or abroad, has soared into
a different realm than any that had gone before."' In emphasizing the dis-
cretionary authority granted to the CAB, the Court in fact warned of the
impropriety of assuming that Congress had intended that judicial prece-
dents and rules of interpretation applicable to the other forms of trans-
portation were to be applied to the regulation of air transportation by the
CAB.
Title IV of the Act sets forth the economic powers delegated to the
CAB. The heart of that chapter is Section 401,' which states that no carrier
shall engage in air transportation unless granted a certificate of conveni-
ence and necessity authorizing such transportation. Other provisions of
Section 401 direct the Board to issue such certificates, upon application and
after notice and hearing; if it finds that the air transportation covered by
an application is required by the public convenience and necessity and that
the applicant is fit, willing and able to perform such transportation proper-
ly and to conform to all the provisions of the Act and to the rules and
regulations of the Board.
Title IV embodies a specific and detailed system of regulation over the
economic activities of the air carriers. The Board is given authority over:
the rates to be charged for carriage of persons and property," the con-
solidation, merger, and acquisition of control of air carriers," the inter-
locking arrangements between carriers,1' rates for mail carriage, 2 and
some agreements between carriers. 3 In addition, air carriers are required
to furnish air transportation authorized in their certificates and to provide
safe and adequate service.' Where so authorized, the carriers must provide
4 Jones, Anamoly of the CAB in American Government, 20 J. Air L. & Com. 140, 141 (1953).
Mr. Jones, a former member of the CAB, considers the delegation of power to the Board to be
so broad as to surpass Constitutional limits, id. at 149.
'52 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958):
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this Act, the
Authority shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public
interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity-
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of
the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense.
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an
air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States ....
(e) The regulation of air commerce as to best promote its development and safety.
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.
6 Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 107 (1948).
7 Ibid.
8 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1958).
9 52 Stat. 992 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1958).
'o 52 Stat. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1958).
'1 52 Stat. 1002 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1379 (1958).
1"52 Star. 998 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1958).
1" 52 Star. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1383 (1958).
14 52 Stat, 998 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1958),
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necessary and adequate facilities for the transportation of mail whenever
required by the Postmaster General."
The Act thus combines a broad grant of power to the Board to promote
and regulate the air transportation system in the national interest with
specific and detailed provisions for the regulation of certified carriers. The
complex and burdensome duties imposed upon the certified carriers are
factors of great importance when the Board's power to exempt carriers
from these requirements is considered.
B. Scope Of Section 416
1. Text of 416
While comprehensive regulation was required for the industry as a
whole, Congress determined that such regulation might be too stringent
and inflexible if applied to all carriers, whatever their size, without quali-
fication or relief.' Accordingly, the Board was given authority to classify
and exempt, under certain circumstances and conditions, air carriers from
the requirements of Title IV. This authority was set forth in Section 416,"
which provides:
(a) The Board may from time to time establish such just and reasonable
classifications or groups of air carriers for the purposes of this subchapter
as the nature of the services performed by such air carriers shall require ....
(b) (1) The Board, from time to time and to the extent necessary (except
as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection) may exempt from the
requirements of this subchapter or any provision thereof, or any rule, regula-
tion, term, condition, or limitation prescribed thereunder, any air carrier or
class of air carriers, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter or
such provision, or such rule, regulation, term, condition or limitation is or
would be an undue burden on such air carrier or class of air carriers by reason
of the limited extent of, or unusual circumstances affecting, the operations of
such air carrier or class of air carriers and is not in the public interest.
Subsection (b) (2) precludes the Board generally from granting to
scheduled carriers exemptions relating to the wages and hours of pilots.
The Board may grant such an exemption to any air carrier not engaged in
scheduled air transportation, or to any scheduled air carrier to the extent
that the operations of such carriers are conducted during daylight hours,
if upon notice and hearing, certain findings are made.
Disagreement and uncertainty have marked the question of the extent
of discretionary power conferred upon the Board by Section 416. While
the principal emphasis of this paper will be on the procedural problems en-
countered by the Board's exercise of its exemptive powers, the scope of
this power in terms of who may be granted exemptions is of more than
tangential importance. Indeed, only after it is established who may be
granted exemptions, may it be determined how such exemptions are to be
administered. While Board power as exercised under Section 416 is perhaps
a more narrow function than the Board's route-making or rate-making
operations, nonetheless the conflict over the scope of power delegated to
the Board by Section 416 has raised pervasive and far-reaching problems of
administrative law.
" 52 Stat. 994 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (195).
1 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3659,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938).
" Stat. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. 5 1386 (1958).
EXEMPTION PROVISION OF THE C.A.A.
2. Conflicting Theories of Interpretation
One commentator, Senator Joseph O'Mahoney, in a paper prepared for
presented to the Senate Small Business Subcommittee, stated that the
exemption provision "in effect gave the Board plenary power to issue
exemptions for any class of carriers" and "except for wage and hour re-
strictions, no other restrictions were introduced or ever imposed upon the
exemption powers which the Congress apparently wished the Board to
exercise freely and boldly in order to usher in the new air age."" This view,
argued most vigorously by the irregular air carriers, in effect maintains
that the Act provided two alternative methods for authorizing air trans-
portation-by certificate, issued after a hearing in conformity with the
detailed requirements of the Act, or by exemption, issued without a hear-
ing on such terms as the Board establishes.
Another critic reached the opposite conclusion: "Section 416 (b) is
[only] a necessary escape valve to permit the postponement of the certi-
ficate requirement and other economic regulations in limited types of cir-
cumstances." '19 The Section is merely a "dispensing" or "suspending" power
and in no sense is 416 a delegation of powers to authorize affirmative certi-
ficate-type privileges. The provision was intended to relieve certain small,
limited-operation air carriers from the obligations of the Act which might
otherwise threaten their survival. No "plenary" power was ever intended
or conferred."0
A brief analysis of the decisions of the Court of Appeals reveals a gradu-
al trend away from the position advocated by Senator O'Mahoney and
the irregular carriers.
3. Judicial Analysis
The first important case dealing with Section 416 arose in 1956.1 The
Board had permitted non-certified air carriers to transport mail by grant-
ing these carriers an exemption for that purpose.' The certified air carriers
challenged the Board's power to permit mail carriage by exempiton,
arguing that the only delegation of authority to the Board for selecting
mail carriers was through the certification process." The court refused to
rule on the contention, made by the noncertified carriers, that 416(b)
extends the Board's exemptive power to any air carrier and to any provi-
sion of Title IV. Instead, a divided court held that since there is no statutory
limitation in 416 with respect to mail exemptions, the Board is free to issue
"8 O'Mahoney, Legislative History of the Right of Entry Into Air Transportation, 20 J. Air L.
& Com. 330, 348 (1953).
"oCraig, New Look at Section 416(b), 21 J. Air L. & Com. 127, 157 (1954). See also Netter-
ville, The Regulation of Irregular Air Carriers: A History, 16 J. Air L. & Com. 414 (1949).
" Craig, suPra note 19, at 148.
sa American Airlines v. CAB, 231 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
2Surface Mail by Air, Exemptions, 20 C.A.B. 659 (1955). See also Mail Transportation by
Non-certified Carriers, 18 C.A.B. 201 (1953).
2"Air carriers holding contracts for the transportation of mail at the time the Act was passed
were authorized by Congress to continue carrying mail until a certificate for mail transportation
was granted or denied by the Board-Section 405(a). Air carriers and the Postmaster General
were both permitted to apply for certificates for additional mail service-Sections 401(b) and
401 (n)-which the Board could grant or deny, after notice and hearing. Section 405 (g) provided
further that:
From and after the issuance of any certificate authorizing the transportation of
mail by aircraft, the Postmaster General shall tender mail to the holder thereof, to
the extent required by the postal service . . . and such mail shall be transported by
the air carrier holding such certificate in accordance with such rules, regulations,
and requirements as may be prorsulgated by the Postm st¢r General under this section.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
such exemptions. Despite the court's reticence, this decision would appear to
substantiate Senator O'Mahoney's assertion that the only limit on the scope
of the Board's exemptive powers is imposed by 416(b) (2) regarding
wages and hours. For if the court will require specific statutory limitations
on the Board's exemptive power before precluding the Board from exer-
cising such power, the Board will have a free hand in granting exemptions.'
The advantage to a carrier of obtaining a grant of authority via the
exemption route is patent. Delay by the CAB is an accepted ingredient of
every administrative determination." Because there is no requirement of
notice and hearing prior to the granting of an exemption, 6 acquiring
operating authority under 416 allows a carrier to cut through the morass
of Board procedures and obtain a quick agency decision. Competitors need
not be heard and the elaborate requirements of Title IV need not be met.
However, the existence of these requirements in Title IV militates
against the broad interpretation of 416 advanced by Senator O'Mahoney
and apparently followed by the court in the mail certification case." The
spectacle of a regulatory act, contradicting itself, with one area of trans-
portation regulated by one set of requirements and procedures, and another
area, overlapping the first, regulated only by the unpredictable discretion
of the agency, tied to no standards or procedures, would not seem within
the intent of Congress.
This view was explored but not conclusively endorsed by the court in
another 1956 decision.'6 The certified carriers, again, had attacked the
power of the Board to grant exemptions to irregular air carriers where,
they claimed, no undue burden on the irregular carrier had been shown."
The court analyzed Section 416 as containing two elements:
In the first place, in broad language, it empowers the Board to exempt any
class of carriers from "any provision" of the statute or "any rule, regulation,
term, condition, or limitation prescribed thereunder." This is sweeping
language. The second basic provision in the paragraph is that in order to
exert this broad power of exempton, the Board must find that the enforce-
ment of the statutory provision is or would be an "undue burden" on the
class of carriers.'
Focusing on the term "undue burden," the court held that the Board
had failed to substantiate its findings that the certification process would
work an undue burden on the irregular carriers. Had the Board made the
required findings as to undue burden, the plan for creating a supplemental
class of carriers would be within the statutory exemption power. The
4 The dissenting opinion, registered by Chief Judge Edgerton, attacked the broad interpretation
of 416(b). The opinion found the limits to the Board's exemptive power in 416 itself, in the
requiring of specific findings from the Board before exemptions could be allowed.
"Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 Yale L.J.
931 (1960). See also Senate Judiciary Committee Print, Report on Regulatory Agencies To Presi-
dent Elect (the Landis Report), 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The inordinate delay regarding the
disposition of administrative proceedings was considered the principal failing of the administrative
process.
" See Ch. IV A infra p. 275.
'"American Airlines v. CAB, 231 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
"6American Airlines v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
'a Second Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 838 (1955).
"6American Airlines v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
"Id. at 851. The court recognized that the Board had been operating under the exemption
statute for years and that the Board in all probability had not stated any more extensive facts to
support its conclusions of undue burden in prior cases than it had in this case. But in the prior
cases the affected carriers were truly irregular, while in the present case, the applicants closely
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court conceded that the Board had wide authority to exempt, and the
opinion did not curtail the power of exemption other than by requiring
from the Board more elaborate factual support to justify the exercise of
power. The case was remanded to the Board for further findings of fact
to support its conclusion."
One further case requires consideration before the scope of the exemp-
tion power can be adequately assessed. In 1957, the CAB had granted an
exemption to Seaboard Air Lines allowing it to carry mail pending a full
mail certification proceeding. The Board had found that Seaboard's finan-
cial distress was acute and that to require a full hearing before allowing
the carrier to carry mail would impose an undue burden on the carrier and
would not be in the public interest. The court reversed the Board's order."
Section 416, stated the court, permits the Board to exempt an air carrier
from the certificate requirements of Section 401' only if it first finds that
enforcement of those requirements would have certain specified results be-
cause of the existence of certain specified conditions:
The Board must find that the "operations" of the carrier seeking the exemp-
tion are either (1) of "limited extent" or (2) affected by "unusual circum-
stances." Aside from finding that one of these conditions is present, the Board
must also find that the condition causes enforcement of the certificate re-
quirements to work "an undue burden" on the carrier."
Furthermore, the court noted that the Board had misunderstood the
"limited extent" requirement of the statute. The term does not refer to
the limited extent of the exemption itself; instead, it refers to the pre-
existing condition of the carrier's operations which qualifies the carrier for
an exemption.
4. Board of Experience
This decision was a serious blow to future Board action under 416 and
buried any lingering possibility that the Board could continue to regulate
the irregular carriers under the exemption provision. In the Board's Annual
Report for 1959, the agency admitted that the Seaboard decision would
result in a substantial curtailment of the Board's exemptive power as it had
resembled the certificated route carriers by virtue of being designated supplemental air carriers and
by the provision allowing them a form of scheduled operation (individually ticketed operations
by each carrier not to exceed ten trips per month in the same direction between any two points).
Consequently, the Board had to meet the standards of the statute and show facts to support its
conclusion that the certification process and requirements would cause an "undue burden" on the
applicant carriers.
" It is submitted that the decision in the instant case left the Court of Appeals vulnerable
to a Chenery type administrative reaction (SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)). In that
landmark case in administrative law, the SEC first sought to disallow transactions in preferred
stock by insiders during reorganization by basing its order on precedents of the Supreme Court.
On review, the highest Court found reliance on these precedents to be in error and reversed (318
U.S. 80 (1943)). The SEC thereupon issued the same order and based its ruling on its general
experience in reorganization matters and on its informed view of the statutory requirements. The
Supreme Court, over a vigorous dissent, then affirmed the second SEC order.
In the American Airlines case, the Board was virtually invited to re-examine the problem,
recast its rationale, and reach the same result. In fact, the court noted that if the Board had
rested a finding of "undue burden" upon the fact that the interim for which the operating
authority is short whereas the remainder of a certification proceeding is long, the court probably
would have affirmed the grant of exemption.
aaPan American Airlines v. CAB, 261 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 912
(1959).
"4 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
"Pan American Airlines v. CAB, 261 F.2d 754, 757. (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.s. 912 (1959).
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theretofore been exercised." The size of the carrier seeking the exemption,
rather than the nature or type of exemption desired, was to be the pre-
vailing standard. While it may be argued that the Board retains wide
powers of exemption insofar as "limited" type carriers are concerned (any
provision of Title IV may still be waived by the Board), in fact a much
needed flexibility in the administration of the nation's air services has been
severely curtailed. The important carriers, and the important problems,
probably can no longer be controlled under 416 when speed or informality
are essential. The Board accurately stated, in reaction to the Seaboard de-
cision, that there are numerous instances in which particular operations for
which exemptions are sought may be of limited nature, scope, or duration,
because limited in time, or to a particular commodity, or to particular
route segments, and clearly in the public interest, although the totality of
the existing operations of the carrier applicant may not be of "limited
extent.""7
An example of the need for such an exemption arose in the Pan
American-National Agreements case." During the Christmas rush, Na-
tional Airlines sought to lease, on a short-term basis, additional planes
from Pan American to handle the increased New York to Miami traffic.
Under Section 408(2)" of the Act-which governed carrier leases of
aircraft-if the Board had followed its normal procedures (prehearing
and hearing, briefs to the examiner, initial decision, briefs and argu-
ment to the Board, and final order) delay of more than one year was
certain."' The Board found that the seasonal rush was an "unusual cir-
cumstance" which justified approval of the leases under 416(b), since the
delay concomitant with normal procedures would negate any advantage to
be gained through the leasing of aircraft.
Relief under 416 would probably now be barred by the recent Court of
Appeals' ruling. Neither National nor Pan American are carriers of "limited
extent." It was the exemption, rather than the carriers, which was of
limited extent and for unusual circumstances. Yet use of the exemptive
power is justified here, particularly in light of the Board's finding that the
transactions had very little relation to the basic purposes-prohibitions
against poolings and unauthorized mergers-of Section 408. 4'
5. Multiple Failures to Amend to Meet Experience
Judge Friendly has suggested that the success of the administrative pro-
cess is dependent upon the development of more definite standards to
govern agency decisions.4' He found that the failure to develop these
standards must be shared by the Congress, the agencies, and by the execu-
tive branch. Initial Congressional failure to establish meaningful standards,
coupled with agency inability to sharpen the vague contours of the original
statute, have been the principal problems. Also noted were further legis-
'1959 CAB Ann. Rep. 37.
'7 107 Cong. Rec. 10958-59 (1961). (Letter from the CAB to Senator Magnuson in support of
S. 2127).
3"28 C.A.B. 960 (1958).
"9 52 Star. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. S 1378 (1958): "It shall be unlawful, unless approved by
order of the authority as provided in this section-(2) For any air carrier . . . to purchase, lease,
or contract to operate the properties . . . of any air carrier."
4028 C.A.B. 960 (1958).
41 Ibid.
"' Friendly, Need for Better Standards in the Administrative Process, 75 Hary, L. Rev. 863
(1961).
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lative failures to supply more definite standards as growing experience had
demanded and failure by the executive to spur legislative activity.'
The Board's experience in administering Section 416 has necessitated a
broader interpretation of that provision than can be gleaned from the
exact language of the statute." Despite the opposition to the Board's use
of the exemption power, the agency did not seek clarification of the
standards under which it was operating until the restrictive holding by the
court in 1958. 4' Two years later, the CAB drafted and submitted to Con-
gress new legislation Senate bill 2127, amending present 416(b) to read:
The Board may issue exemptions to any carrier or class of carriers if it finds
that enforcement of this title or such provision, rule, regulation, term,
condition, or limitation would be impracticable by reason of the limited
extent or duration of, or unusual circumstances affecting, either the existing
operations [of the carrier] or the operations, if any, for which the exemption
is sought."
Two principal revisions were contained in the proposed legislation. The
requirement of "undue burden" on the carrier before it qualified for an
exemption, the issue on which the Board and the court had divided in the
second American Airlines case,47 was relaxed, and the standard of "imprac-
ticality" was substituted. The Board believed that administrative decisions
made under the proposed standard would be less susceptible to judicial
reversal because of the wider scope of the term "impracticality."
The second, and major, revision sought to clarify the question of what
types of carriers were eligible to receive exemptions. The exemption
power would heretofore be available where either the existing operations
of the carrier were of limited extent, or where the nature of the exemption
sought was of limited extent or duration." The stifling requirement im-
posed by the court in the Seaboard case,"1 which precluded exemptive relief
to all carriers not of "limited extent," was overcome by the proposed
legislation. The legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics Act, the
affirmative grant of power under Section 2, and twenty years of experience
in ministering to the problems of the growing air transportation system;
these factors dictated Congressional approval of the Board's proposed
amendment. The Board had found that the limits imposed upon its
exemptive power conflicted with its paramount duty to further all types
of air transportation in the national interest. Yet no Congressional action
was taken on Senate bill 2127. The bill was introduced by Senator Magnu-
son, read twice then referred to the Committee on Commerce where it died.
The multiple failures denounced by Judge Friendly are evident." While
the initial standard proved self-defeating and unworkable, more than
4Id. at 868, 869.
44 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
45Pan American Airlines v. CAB, 261 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
912 (1959).
" Supra note 37.
47 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
48 Supra note 37.
49 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
"Situation such as existed in the Pan American-National Agreaments case (supra note 38 and
accompanying text).
" Seabord Airlines had received the exemption and Pan American was the complaining carrier
(see note 33 supra and accompanying text).
' See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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twenty years elapsed before any change was sought by the agency. During
that period, exemptions of every conceivable type were authorized to every
branch of the industry. In effect, the provision had been re-written to
meet the demands of a complex system. Yet, despite the experience of
twenty years, no Congressional action was taken. The Board had shown
that a broader exemption provision was desirable, but the experience yard-
stick apparently failed to impress the legislative committee. Congressional
failure to relate the exemption provision to the affirmative grant of power
under Section 2; agency failure to seek a change in the standards; and
Congressional inaction in supplying a more workable standard demanded
by experience, make the history of Section 416 strong evidence to support
Judge Friendly's explanation of the problems faced by the administrative
process.
C. The Unique Character Of Section 416
Before an accurate appraisal of the scope of the Board's exemptive power
can be made, the feature which distinguishes Section 416 from exemption
provisions in other regulatory statutes requires consideration. It will then
be perceived that the controversy over the type of carriers which may be
granted exemptions is only a relative one. Even the minimal interpretation
of the exemptive power as proferred by the Seaboard case 3 leaves the CAB
with far greater discretion than that held by any other agency under its
exemption provision.
Essential to an appreciation of the problems of exemption under the
Civil Aeronautios Act is an understanding of the fact that the exemptive
provision is not self-executing. The authority conferred on the Civil Aero-
nautics Board to establish such just and reasonable classifications of carriers
as the nature of the service performed requires, is permissive and does not
compel the Board to establish classifications or to exempt any carrier from
the requirements of Title IV."' This assertion is self evident from the
structure of the Civil Aeronautics Act. Sole power to classify and exempt
carriers from the statutory requirements is vested in the Board. No inde-
pendent right to an exempt status is granted in the Act. The contention
that Section 416 constrains the Board to establish classifications and to
exempt carriers once certain findings are made ignores the permissive na-
ture of the authority conferred on the Board. The simple answer is that
the Board may choose to exempt no one under Section 416.5"
1. Compared to the Securities Act
This discretionary feature of the exemptive powers under the Act con-
trasts Section 416 to provisions granting exemptions in other regulatory
I "Pan American Airlines v. CAB, 261 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
912 (1959).
54Air Transport Associates v. CAB, 199 F.2d 181, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (dictum), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 922 (1953).
" Ibid. While the analogy is not perfect, it is submitted that the Board's power to exempt
carriers from the requirements of the Civil Aeronautics Act can be compared to the Attorney
General's power to suspend the rigors of the deportation provisions. Judge Learned Hand de-
scribed the Attorney General's power in U.S. ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy (180 F.2d 489, 491
(2d Cir. 1950)):
The power of the Attorney General to suspend deportation is a dispensing power,
like a judge's power to suspend the execution of a sentence, or the President's to
pardon a convict. It is a matter of grace, over which the courts have no review,
unless . . . it affirmatively appears that the denial has been actuated by considerations
that Congress could not have intended to make relevant.
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acts. The essential characteristic of the exemptive provisions of the Securi-
ties Act" is the absence of any dependence upon a finding or approval by
the Commission before an exemption can be obtained. Exemption depends
upon factual compliance with the conditions of the particular provision
under which the exemption is sought; and even in cases where these con-
ditions include the filing of papers with the Commission, as in the case of
certain of the exemption regulations adopted by the Commission under
Section 3 (b) of the Act, 7 there is no provision for the taking of any
agency action by the Commission to establish the exemption. "
Section 3 (b) expressly provides for several classes of exempt securities
by reason of the character of the issuer, the manner of distribution, or by
reason of the character of the security regardless of the character of the
issuer. Discretionary authority to add any class of securities to the securi-
ties already exempted by the statute is limited to public offerings of less
than 300,000 dollars." The Act also specifically exempts certain trans-
actions" from the registration requirements6' providing the statutory pre-
requisites are met. If a provision comparable to Section 416 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act were inserted in the Securities Act, the SEC would have
the sole power to exempt any transaction, any distribution, and any
security (no statutory list delimiting exempt of the Act once the Com-
mission determined that those requirements would place an undue burden
on the parties involved and that enforcement of the Act was not in the
public interest.
Thus while dissent exists as to the scope of the power granted to the
CAB under Section 416, there can be no disagreement that the Board's
exemptive powers are infinitely broader and more comprehensive than the
exemptive powers conferred on the SEC.
2. Compared to the Motor Carrier Act
The Board's powers of exemption are similarly more extensive than the
authority delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the
Motor Carrier Act.02 Unlike the exemption provisions of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act (and similar to the sections of the Securities Act) the Motor
Carrier Act contains a rigid statutory framework delimiting the classes
and types of carriers to be exempted from the requirements of the statute.
The Motor Carrier exemption provision is also self executing, i.e., a carrier
need only meet the requirements of the statute to be entitled to an exemp-
tion. The statute specifically exempts certain types and classes of vehicles
from the operation of the Act. Statutory exemptions, for example, are
extended to all motor vehicles employed solely to transport children and
teachers to school; " to all motor vehicles used to carry ordinary livestock;"
and to any casual or occasional transportation of property or passengers in
2048 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1958).
5748 Stat. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1958).
18 Throop and Lane, Some Problems of ExemPtion Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 89, 91 (1937).
5"48 Stat. 76 (1933), 15 U.S.C. S 77(c) (11) (b) (1958).
6048 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1958).
6148 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1958).
6249 Stat. 545 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1958).
0349 Stat. 545, 49 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (1).
6449 Stat. 545, 49 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (6).
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interstate commerce for compensation by a person not engaged in the
business of motor transportation."s
The Civil Aeronautics Act, on the other hand, provides for broad
economic regulation of air transportation without specific statutory ex-
emptions and vests in the Board itself the authority in appropriate cir-
cumstances to exempt carriers which would otherwise be subject to eco-
nomic regulations."6 The authority to exempt extends to "any provision"
of the Act and to "any rule, regulation, term, condition or limitation
prescribed thereunder." Compared to the exemption powers delegated by
Congress to the ICC"7 and the SEC, or to the OPA,"8 the CAB has extensive
power conferred upon it by the "sweeping language" 9 of Section 416.
D. Conclusion: The Scope And Power Of The CAB Under Section 416
In conclusion, therefore, what meaningful estimate can be made with
regard to the scope of the exemption power delegated to the Board? Not
only is it broader and more comprehensive than the authority conferred
on the SEC or the ICC, its very philosophy differs markedly from the
exemption power granted to any other administrative agency. These
agencies have no important independent power to exempt parties which
come under the agency's jurisdiction from the statutory provisions affecting
those parties. The determination to exempt was initially made by Congress,
and the grounds upon which the exemption is to be based are specifically
articulated by statute. In most cases, no discretion exists to exempt a
05 49 Stat. 545, 49 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (9).
" Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1962). Under present regulations,
exemptions are applicable to large irregular air carriers (14 C.F.R. 291); Alaska air carriers
(14 C.F.R. 292); military operations air carriers (14 C.F.R. 294); indirect air carriers (14
C.F.R. 296); international air freight forwarders (14 C.F.R. 297); and air taxi operators (14
C.F.R. 298).
7 Comprehensive statutory exemption is also afforded to certain water carriers by Part III
of the Interstate Commerce Act (54 Stat. 929 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 901-921 (1950)). There
again, no discretionary authority was conferred on the ICC. If the carrier meets the prerequisites
of the statute, it is entitled to an exemption from certain provisions of the Act. The same is
true concerning the exemptions accorded to freight forwarders by Part IV of the Act (56 Stat.
284 (1942), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1021 (1942)). Certain forwarders are exempted from the Act
and the exemptions are self-executing without any agency approval or certification.
"SSection 2(c) of the Emergency Price Control Act (56 Stat. 26 (1942)) established the
exception powers of the Administrator, and provided:
Any regulation or order under this section may be established in such form and
manner, may contain such classifications and differentiations, and may provide for
such adjustments and reasonable exceptions, as in the judgment of the Administrator
are necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes of the act.
The administrative exception was granted where general rules worked hardship in individual
cases. It was an activity in which the District offices and the board became increasingly engaged.
See Thompson, The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing 339 (1950). There was so much
mechanical procedural detail in the regulations that boards had to grant exceptions in order to
operate within legal limits. Any person seeking relief from a ration order for which no provision
was made in the order was to petition the deputy administrator, in writing, for such relief. He had
to show why granting relief in his case and in all like cases would not defeat the process of
rationing (Thompson, op. cit. supra at 340). See also, A Short History of the O.P.A. U.S. Office
of Temporary Controls, Historical Report No. 15 (1947). Thus, while the language of the en-
abling legislation appears similar to the phrasing of Section 416 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, the
courts have construed the powers of the administrator as requiring him to grant an exception once
equitable grounds had been presented which warranted relief. The courts have spoken in terms of
"duty" but while a wide range of discretion no doubt existed, the administrator was subject to judi-
cial review in terms of the petitioner's right to an exception. The right-privilege dichotomy will be
discussed in Chapter III C infra p. 272. Respecting the initial grant or denial of an application, the
appellation of the petitioner's interest as a right or privilege is of crucial importance.
e See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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party not included in the statutory grant, and no discretion exists not to
exempt a carrier or party which does meet the statutory definition.
The conflict described earlier regarding the limits to be imposed on the
Board's power has thus been placed in its proper perspective. The minimal
interpretation of the CAB's exemption authority advanced by the com-
mentators who support the scheduled airlines' position still goes far beyond
the discretionary authority granted by Congress to other agencies. "Escape-
valve"7 exemption power which extends to any rule, regulation or statu-
tory provision which might create an undue burden on a carrier remains
far broader than the exemption authority held by other agencies. The
unique character of Section 416 has created unique procedural problems
in the administration of the exemption authority. The exploration and
analysis of these problems composes the bulk of this paper.
III. ADMINISTERING SECTION 416: BOARD PROCEDURES AND
THE HEARING REQUIREMENT
The antecedent discussion relating to the scope and unique nature of
Section 416 has direct relevance to the subsequent chapters of this paper
which examine in detail the procedures utilized by the CAB in administer-
ing the exemption provision. This section devotes itself exclusively to
the clash between the unlimited exercise of Board discretion, and the
various checks on agency power imposed by the adjudicatory hearing.
This conflict is viewed as the source of great unrest in the administrative
process, and the question of the scope of agency authority originally dele-
gated by Congress plays an important role in the analysis.
Stated simply, does the singular character of the exemption provision,
whereby broad powers are granted to the CAB to exempt any carrier
under its jurisdiction from any provision of the air transportation scheme,
have an impact on the procedures which the Board will be required to
follow in administering its power? The procedure with which this paper
is particularly concerned is the absence or presence of a hearing prior to
agency action under Section 416.
A. Lack Of Statutory Guidance On A Hearing Requirement
1. No Reference to Notice and Hearing
The right to an evidentiary hearing is regarded as the most effective
check on the arbitrary exercise of administrative discretion. 1 As one
court has expressed it, "in our jurisprudence an opportunity to present
arguments orally . . . is one of the rudiments of fair play required when
property has been taken or destroyed."7
Unfortunately, on such a critical issue of whether and when an evi-
dentiary hearing is required prior to the exercise of Board power under
Section 416, the statutes are silent. Section 416(b) (1)7" contains no refer-
ence to notice or hearing, even though other provisions of the Act, in-
cluding 416 (b) (2)," specifically preclude Board action without notice
and hearing being afforded the affected parties.
70 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
"
2E.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); FCC v. Station WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949).
72 Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See Ch. IV B infra.
73 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
7452 Stat. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(2) (1958).
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2. No Reference to Licensee Status
A second pertinent omission in Section 416 is the definition of the status
of the exemption applicant or holder in terms of license protection. Much
of the ensuing discussion would be moot if Section 416 gave an exemption
holder the status of a licensee, since the Administrative Procedure Act
would then interpose its protective features 5 regulating the conduct of
7560 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d), (e) (1958):
(e) "License" includes the whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval,
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption, or other form of permission.
"Licensing" includes agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation,
suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or condition-
ing of a license.
See also 92 Cong. Rec. 5649 (1946) (remarks of Representative Walker) reprinted in S. Doc.
No. 356. The Chairman of the House subcommittee that reported the bill stated during debate
that this definition was intended "to embrace every form of operation where a private party is
required to take the initiative in securing the official permission of the agency."
Administrative exceptions have been labeled as actually piecemeal solutions to former planning
errors. See Thompson, op. cit. supra note 68, at 341. In back of the administrative exception device
was an abhorrence of a rule governing a very small group, especially a named group, in the regula-
tions. Thompson reports that many rationing attorneys thought classifications into small groups
smacked of arbitrariness, although such classifications were acceptable if described as administrative
exceptions. See Thompson, op. cit. supra note 68, at 342. Also, unpublished administrative exceptions
were found to be a useful device for granting the petitioner's request without other persons finding
out about it and claiming the same treatment.
Superficially, the exception powers of the administrator would seem to resemble closely the
exemption authority delegated to the CAB. Both provisions employ the terms "may provide" or
"may exempt" and thereby appear to grant broad administrative powers to exempt when in
the public interest. Furthermore, the OPA section contains no statutory list of those persons
entitled to an exception; as in the Civil Aeronautics Act, exceptions are to be determined by
the administrative agency and were not prescribed initially by Congress.
A very different standard of judicial review existed, however, from OPA orders denying
petitions for exceptions. Unlike such orders of the CAB, which were virtually unreviewable (see
Ch. III C infra), the history of the Emergency Court of Appeals is studded with cases in which
the petitioning individual or corporation sought judicial reversal of an OPA order denying an
application for an exception.
The applicable standard of judicial review over OPA decisions to grant or deny exceptions was
established in Hillcrest Terrace Corp. v. Brown (137 F.2d 663 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943)). The
complaining landlord sought an exception from the prevailing maximum rent limits on the
grounds that his existing rent scale represented the passing on to his tenants of a one year tax
exemption granted to newly constructed buildings.
The administrator had denied his application on the belief that the situation could not, in
principle, be distinguished from that of any other landlord who, in a free competitive market
existing on the maximum rent date, had accepted a rent which later turned out to be unprofitable
on account of subsequent cost increases.
On appeal, the court disagreed with the administrator and vacated the order denying an
adjustment. The court found that the peculiar facts affecting the petitioner made his situation
fall within the general pattern for individual adjustments already provided for in the regulations,
even though not fitting exactly in any specific category. The administrator acted arbitrarily in
refusing to expand the adjustment provisions to cover the situation. Provisions for adjustment
can be made for persons in the complainant's position consistent with the general regulatory
scheme.
The court determined that the rents which the complainant was charging on the maximum
rent day were not the product of general market conditions of supply and demand on that date.
The particular complainant had a tax exemption not available to landlords generally, and his motives
in passing on the advantage to his tenants were irrelevant.
While the court recognized that it had no power to order that an adjustment be made, the
court stated without doubt the administrator, upon remand, would be able to devise an amend-
ment to the adjustment provision to cover the situation presented without laying himself open
to an undue administrative burden.
The administrator was able to work out an exception and the Hillcrest doctrine of substituted
judicial judgment on adjustment and exception cases became the standard method of judicial
review. See Problems in Price Control: Legal Phases Part I, The Emergency Court of Appeals, U.S.
Office of Temporary Controls, Historical Report No. 11 (1947).
In Adams, Rowe eg Norman, Inc. v. Bowles (144 F.2d 357 (Emer. Ct. App. 1944)), the court
applied the Hillcrest doctrine to hold a rent regulation invalid insofar as it failed to accord
special treatment to houses owned by the complainants, coal mine operators, and rented by them
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a government agency towards a license-holder. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, notice and hearing necessarily precede any diminution or
termination of a license by the controlling agency. The Administrative
Procedure Act does require an evidentiary hearing "in every case of ad-
judication required by statute,"7 but the initial problem as already ex-
pressed is that Section 416 makes no reference to adjudication or rule-
making procedures.
While inferences can be drawn from the statutory omissions,7 no con-
crete guidance can be acquired from Section 416 when a demand for a
hearing is made by an interested party. When faced with this problem,
the courts will necessarily turn to an analysis of the functions being per-
formed by the Board when it administers the exemption power. The mis-
leading nature of this type of investigation will become evident in the
following section.
B. The Unsatisfactory Nature Of The Separation-Of-Powers Labels
Under our system, writes Jaffe, the exercise of government power will
not be tolerated unless subject to procedural safeguards."8 No one quarrels
with this sentiment, but each commentator would draw the line balancing
procedural due process and administrative efficiency at a different point.
The balancing process, whatever its merits in other controversies, plays an
important role here because there is general agreement that not every de-
cision by an administrative agency need be accompanied by equal pro-
cedural safeguards. Which decisions, and which safeguards, remain the
devisive questions.
In the present discussion, on one side of the balance are arrayed the
broad delegation of power to the CAB to exempt carriers from the restric-
tive provisions of the Act when in the public interest; the absence of any
standards in the Federal Aviation Act delimiting the procedures to be
followed in exemption proceedings; the apparent intent of Congress not
to tie the hands of the Board through required procedures; a staggering
number of applicants for, or holders of exemption authority; and the
to their employees. The basis of the decision was that the rentals were tied to a collective bar-
gaining agreement and were increased after the maximum rent date in accordance with the labor
agreement. The court stated:
We are confident that Congress intended not only that the regulations should be
generally fair and equitable, but that it should be the duty of the administrator under
Section 2 (c) to avoid or eliminate manifest inequities in exceptional classes of cases so
far as this might reasonably be done consistent with the main objective of the act and
with the effective administration of the stabilization program (emphasis added).
(d) "Order" means the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any agency in any
matter other than rule-making but including licensing. "Adjudication" means agency
process for the formulation of an order.
w 6 0 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).7' For conflicting interpretations of the meaning of the statutory omissions, see Standard Airlines
v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Ch. IV infra p. 275. Contra, Eastern Airlines v. CAB,
185 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir 1950); Ch. IV A infra p. 275.7
sJaffe, Effective Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1129 (1954).
7 Compare Hector, Problems of the C.A.B. and the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 69 Yale
L.J. 931 (1960), who seeks to withdraw all adjudicatory powers from the administrative agencies,
with Elias, Administrative Discretion-No Solution in Sight, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 313 (1960), who
considers the problem one of standards and supports the multi-sided nature of the administra-
tive agency.
For a complete analysis of the need for the development of more definite standards to govern
agency adjudication, see Friendly, Need for Better Standards in the Administrative Agency, 75
Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1961).
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Board's need to maintain strict control over carriers which are otherwise
free of the restrictive limits of the Federal Aviation Act.
Against this rather impressive list of public interest considerations and
administrative necessities lies the specter of government deprivation of
property without due process of law. Specifically, the countervailing
danger is the loss of procedural safeguards in a proceeding where private
property is so clearly subject to agency control. What might be considered
the fulcrum of this shifting balance is the fact that only two forms of
proceedings are open to an agency once a determination is made to change
the status quo.
1. General Commentary: Rule Making versus Adjudication
Conventionally, rule-making is regarded as the function of laying down
general regulations of future applicability. Labeled a legislative function,
rule-making or policy-making is formulated normally on the basis of ex-
tensive and informal interchanges between the regulatory agency and
interested parties with the work delegated from the agency heads to the
staff. Formal hearings, so the conventional analysis runs, are not appropriate
to rule-making proceedings."0 Adjudication, on the other hand, involves
the formulation of judgments or orders that apply to named persons on
the basis of present or past facts. It depends on formalized procedures,
the creation of a record with adequate opportunity for presentation and
cross examination of testimony, and final judgment on the record alone by
the persons responsible for decision."1
This paper demonstrates the thesis, advanced by several commentators,82
that the distinction between rule-making and adjudication is illusory and
not helpful in solving the fundamental dilemma facing the agency-either
the effective processing of an enormous case load or formal evidentiary
hearings for the participants. Under present procedures, the value of rule-
making to an agency is patent: (1) economy of time and effort through
the governing and determination of many situations at once, (2) firm
guidance to affected parties by means of regulations and (3) confidence
on the part of agency personnel in handling future situations governed
by regulations."3 An alternative method of announcing general principles,
through adjudicatory decision,"* is generally considered not to carry as
much force nor to be as widely publicized as announced regulations.
The dangers of the rule-making process to the holder of an exemption
are equally clear.8" Unlike his brother, the certified carrier, ' the provisions
" Bernstein, The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis, 26 Law & Contemp. Prob.
329, 332 (1961); see also Fuchs, Fairness and Effectiveness in Administrative Agency Organization
and Procedures, 36 Ind. L.J. 1, 44 (1960).
81 Fuchs, supra note 80, at 45.
82 Massel, The Regulatory Process, 26 Law & Contemp. Prob. 181, 187 (1961); Bernstein,
suira note 80, at 332.
83 Fuchs, supra note 80, at 48.
84 As suggested by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commission 40-42 (1949). The announced principles
would thereafter be summarized in the annual reports of the agencies.
8" Fuchs, supra note 80, at 49. See also Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Ad-
ministrative Decisions, 59 W. Va. L. Rev. 111 (1957).
" An applicant for a certificate of convenience and necessity is entitled to a speedy public
hearing at which any person may file a protest or memorandum in support of the issuance (52 Stat.
987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (c) (1958)). The Board, upon petition or complaint or upon its own
initiative, after notice and hearings, may alter, amend, modify or suspend any such certificate in
whole or in part, or may revoke any such certificate for intentional failure to comply with any
provision of the statute or any Board order, provided, that no such certificate shall be revoked
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of the Federal Aviation Act do not guarantee him a hearing if his status
or operating authority is modified, suspended or revoked. Furthermore, the
protective features of the Administrative Procedure Act available to license
holders have not been uniformly accorded to holders of exemption au-
thority."' While not every holder of an exemption should be granted
licensee protection," there seems to be no justifiable reason to compel the
Board to adjudicate a regular carrier out of business but to permit the
Board to rule an irregular air carrier into extinction, particularly where
the investment by an exempt carrier may be just as great.
The cases explored at length herein, particularly American Air Trans-
port"9 and Great Lakes,"0 will illustrate that the categories of rule-making
and adjudication, which can be applied in a limited way to distinguish the
end products of administrative regulation, namely rules and orders, often
are meaningless if applied to the operating process by which rules and
orders are produced. Bernstein summarizes the factors which account for
the intermixture of broad policy-formulation and individual decision-
making:
The first is the manifest difficulty in many instances of formulating a
guiding policy in advance of the consideration of individual cases because
the issues involved are highly complex or controversial, or are matters which
remain substantially unresolved by existing legislation. The second factor is
that many policies cannot be determined or ought not to be decided except in
connection with the processing of specific cases of adjudication. 1
2. Davis: Adjudicatory versus Legislative Facts
Professor Davis recognizes that the most important reason why whole
proceedings cannot properly be labeled "judicial" or "legislative" is that
in a single proceeding a tribunal commonly acts both judicially and legis-
latively. He points out that even in a judicial proceeding before a court,
the process of creating law or policy which will be applicable in future
cases of the same sort is rather clearly legislative, and a trial type of hearing
ordinarily is not required for this part of the proceeding."
The test proposed by Davis to aid the tribunal in determining whether
a particular issue is legislative or judicial, and thus whether a trial type of
hearing would be required, is his celebrated "legislative" and "adjudica-
tive" fact dichotomy. 3 Facts pertaining to the parties and their businesses
and activities, that is, adjudicative facts, are intrinsically the kind of facts
unless the holder fails to comply with an order of the Board commanding obedience to the provisions
or order found to have veen violated (52 Stat. 988 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1958)).
• 8American Air Transport v. CAB, 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Ch. IV C infra p. 281.
Contra, Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB, 293 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Ch. IV D infra p. 287.
" Temporary exemptions of a specified duration need not confer licensee status upon the
holder. It is fundamentally a question of justifiable reliance upon an agency decision. Where con-
siderable investment is encouraged by agency exemption policy, as in the irregular air carrier
cases, greater protection to a carrier than the mere opportunity to present written objections to
the termination of its authority should be afforded. On the other hand, where an exemption for
a thirty day period, or for a particular operation at a particular time, is granted, the holder thereof
should not be heard to complain if the Board refused to renew the exemption without granting
the carrier a hearing on the question. The Board would have the power to deal with that class
or type of exemption holders under rule-making procedures.
89201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
90294 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
" Bernstein, supra note 80, at 333.
" Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 7.03 (1958 ed.).
93 Id. S 7.02.
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that ordinarily ought not to be determined without giving the parties a
chance to know and meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them,
that is, without providing an opportunity for trial.
Legislative facts, on the other hand, usually do not concern the immedi-
ate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions
of law, policy and discretion. The true principle is that a party who has
a sufficient interest"- or right at stake in a determination of government
action should be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with the
weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument, unfavor-
able evidence of adjudicative facts." This test, while certainly not a con-
clusive guide for agency action or for criticism of administrative decisions,
not only provides a useful framework for analysis, but also often sub-
stantiates what otherwise must be termed a "*gut" reaction to an agency
determination. Generally, what appears to be an unfair administrative
decision if rendered without a hearing fails to survive discussion when
judged by Davis' proposed distinctions. This will become evident when
the Board's exemption cases are discussed."
The distinctive feature of the exemption provision is that it raises the
issue of "sufficient interest," which a party must have to gain a hearing on
questions of adjudicative facts. The problems of right and privilege will
be pondered below, but it is important to note here that the confusion over
the question of whether an exemption is a right or a privilege has several
facets: first, the issue arises when an exemption is applied for; and
second, the issue is posed when the Board seeks to modify or terminate an
exemption. The CAB has argued "7 that an exemption remains a privilege
both before and after it is granted, and therefore, as will be discussed in
the following section, the carrier applicant or holder has not a sufficient
interest to demand an adjudicatory hearing at any time. It is submitted
that the Board is only half right, in that a party may very well acquire
a sufficient interest in its exempt status by its use of the opportunities
afforded by an exemption and therefore be entitled to a hearing when the
exemption is sought to be terminated or severely modified. On the other
hand, an exemption in its latent form, not yet granted to an applicant,
closely resembles a privilege, and an evidentiary hearing need not be held
on a petition for an exemption. These views will be substantiated by the
subsequent analysis of the exemption cases decided by the Board and the
courts.
C. Defining The Exemption Status: Right Versus Privilege
The most important principle about requirement of opportunity to be
heard is that a party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake in a
determination of government action is ordinarily entitled to an oppor-
tunity for a trial type hearing on issues of adjudicative facts. The de-
termination of a sufficient interest traditionally has been based on whether
the party enjoys a privilege or a right to a particular decision by an agency.
It will be recalled that the CAB's exemption powers differed markedly
" The term "sufficient interest" will be discussed under C infra.
9s Davis, op. cit. supra note 92, § 7.02.
"See particularly the Great Lakes decision (294 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1961)); Ch. IV D
infra p. 287.
" Most recently in the Great Lakes case, supra note 96.
98 Davis, op. cit. supra note 92, § 7.11.
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from the provisions governing exemptions in the Securities Act and the
Motor Carrier Act.99 The critical difference was that Section 416 was not
self-executing; no independent statutory standard established the exemp-
tion, leaving no discretionary authority in the agency. Unlike the other
exemption provisions, an applicant for an exemption from the CAB could
not successfully seek judicial review of the Board's refusal to grant an
exemption on the grounds that it had fulfilled the statutory criteria for
an exemption and therefore was entitled to the authority.'0 The Board,
not the statute, created exemptions.
This fact is of fundamental importance when the question of privilege
or right is considered. Limiting the discussion to the granting of an
exemption, it becomes apparent that no carrier applicant has a right to
an exemption. The sole authority for the granting of an exemption lies in
the discretionary power of the CAB. The reasoning of the Supreme Court
in an alien-exclusion case... is somewhat analogous: the Court upheld the
exclusion of an alien without the granting of a hearing on the grounds
that it was dealing with a matter of privilege, and since the petitioner had
no vested right of entry into the country, no hearing was required prior
to the Attorney General's determination to exclude.' Pushing the analogy
a bit further, it should be noted that once the privilege has been granted
(the alien is admitted), a due process hearing then becomes a requirement
before the "privilege" can be revoked.' It is submitted that once an
exemption is permitted, other factors enter the picture when the govern-
ment acts to alter or to terminate the grant. '
The absence of any requirement for a hearing prior to granting or
denying an exemption also follows from the nature of the decision taken
by the Board. An exemption can be granted only when it is in the public
interest to waive the requirements of the regulatory provisions of the
Civil Aeronautics Act. This is not a particular fact relevant to the qualifi-
cations of the applicant. It is rather an administrative determination of
policy based on the Board's assessment of the needs of the national trans-
portation system at the time when the application is sought. No trial
record could serve as grounds for such a decision. The applicant's qualifi-
cations can be adequately stated in its petition for the exemption, and the
ultimate decision whether the national system requires that the exemption
be granted is clearly one that the Board is best equipped to make.
The critical issue is whether the above reasoning also applies where the
privilege of an exemption is modified or terminated by the CAB. In a
recent case, one court concluded that since the carrier held its exemption
only at the "sufferance of the Board," no adjudicatory hearing need pre-
cede the termination of a carrier's exemption authority despite the business
investment incurred by the carrier during more than fifteen years of
"9 See Ch. II C supra p. 265.
10 Air Transport Associates v. CAB, 199 F.2d 181, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 922 (1953).
' United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Perhaps a disclaimer is
is required here. The reasoning of the Supreme Court is cited for illustrative purposes only. No
approval of the Attorney General's practices nor of the decision in Knauff is intended.
"ea Id. at 544.
1..Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1949).
'0o In another context, see In re Carter (177 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1949), in which the court held
that a license (to do business as a bail bondsman) once grantW wgs a "right" which could not
be revoked without a hearing required by due process,
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operations."' The court reached this conclusion despite an earlier decision
conferring licensee status upon holders of exemptions ' and in the face
of clear adjudicative determinations by the agency with the carrier having
no opportunity to meet and to rebut damaging evidence. Has not the
court carried the doctrine of privilege too far by sustaining the CAB's
decision to terminate and not requiring an evidentiary hearing on the
issues in dispute? It is submitted that the court committed error, but such
a conclusion requires the critic to explain how a privilege becomes a right,
since it is agreed that no right exists when an exemption is first sought.
This problem is faced in the concluding portion of the paper.
D. Conclusion: Hearing Requirement Under 416
Clearly, "the public interest, with which administrative agencies are
charged, includes an interest in procedures fair to those whom they
affect.""1 The fundamental problem with which this report is concerned
is the problem of reconciling, in the field of administrative action, dem-
ocratic safeguards and standards of fair play with the effective conduct
of government. The CAB, in its combined promotional and regulatory
functions pursuant to Section 416, is faced with enormous problems
due simply to the sheer number of carriers which seek or hold authority
under that section. The inadequacy of the strict dichotomy between the
rule-making and adjudicatory functions will become evident as the
Board's problems are outlined. The lack of statutory guidance in the Civil
Aeronautics Act as to the status of an exemption holder, whether he be
a "licensee" entitled to the protective features of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.0 8 or a bare "permittee" wholly at the control of the Board, is
still another question facing the agency and the courts.
Since Section 416 contains no reference to the procedures relevant to
Board action under the provision, the interrelationship between the Con-
stitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Civil Aeronautics
Act must be explored in an effort to "fill in the gaps" left by Section 416.
Where to cast the balance between strict procedural safeguards and effec-
tive agency regulation of an industry whose economic health has become
a responsibility of government is perhaps the principal problem in ad-
ministrative law today. This study is organized by proceeding from the
relatively facile to the difficult problems, particularly in order to show that
easy answers offer no solution to complex issues. Discussed first is Board
power to grant and to terminate individual exemptions and court reaction
to the procedures employed during exercises of such power. Since the Board
will attempt to follow the same procedure when it terminates an exemp-
tion as it followed in granting the exemption, intervening Constitutional
considerations play a major role in the discussion. This is particularly true
since the Civil Aeronautics Act alone will not support a finding that certain
procedures must be observed by the Board prior to action under Sec-
tion 416.
The major portion of this paper concerns a problem which has received
little attention in periodicals or commentaries. Because of the broad dis-
... Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
1°°American Air Transport v. CAB, 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
X°Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure, 26 Law & Contemp. Prob. 203,
204 (1961).
10 60 Stat 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 5§ 1001-1011 (1958).
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cretionary power conferred on the Board by Section 416, the conflict
between the untrammeled exercise of administrative authority and the
imposition of required procedural practices is sharply defined. Pursuant
to its exemptive powers, the CAB has been able to employ the rule-making
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to make adjudicatory
decisions which terminate or amend the authority held by a carrier under
Section 416. In so doing, the Board has denied to exemption holders rights
guaranteed to them under the Administrative Procedure Act. The ultimate
refutation of this practice is the goal of this analysis.
IV. BOARD PRACTICE UNDER 416
A. Granting An Exemption
1. Eastern Airlines v. CAB
The procedural corrolary of the absence of any duty requiring the Board
to grant an exemption is the non-applicability of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act provisions requiring an adjudicatory proceeding. In Eastern
Airlines v. CAB, 9 Capitol Airlines had been granted an exemption allow-
ing it to engage in transactions otherwise prohibited by the Act. The
savings to Capitol were estimated at 11,000 dollars per month. Eastern
Airlines, a competitor which opposed the exemption," sought judicial
review of the exemption order on the grounds that the Board had refused
to hold a hearing prior to issuing the exemption. The Administrative
Procedure Act imposes the requirement of notice and full hearing
"in every case of adjudication required by statute..' ' . Although Section
416(b) (1) does not mention a hearing, Eastern contended that by au-
thorizing the Board to grant exemptions if the Board "find" certain things,
Section 416 impliedly requires adjudication.
The court rejected the contention and stated that such a requirement
would "frustrate" the action of Congress in granting an exemption power
to the Board. There would be no point in permitting the Board to exempt
a carrier from the delay and other burdens of a full hearing under Section
401 (h)"2 and at the same time require the Board, before granting an
exemption, to hold a similar full hearing under Section 416:
The purpose of Congress in permitting the Board to grant exemptions was
to avoid "undue burden" on carriers. Both that purpose and the fact that
"notice and hearing" which are used in many acts of Congress and in some
sections of the Civil Aeronautics Act are omitted from 416(b) (1) indicate
that this paragraph does not require a full hearing."'
The omission of a requirement of notice and hearing in 416(b) (1),
while 401 (h) and particularly (b) (2)14 require notice and hearing, points
"9 185 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1950), vacated as moot, 341 U.S. 901 (1951). The exemption had,
by its terms, expired prior to consideration by the Court of Appeals. That court had retained juris-
diction, erroneously, on the grounds that judicial decision of important questions that are likely to
recur should not be defeated by short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review.
110 Eastern was deemed to have a substantial interest in the exemption order so as to permit
judical recourse under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 1024 (1938), 49 U.S.C. S 1486(a)
(1958).
... 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. S 1004 (1958).
"'The certification proceeding under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49
U.S.C. S 1371(h) (1958).
"' Eastern Airlines v. CAB, 185 F.2d 426, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
114 52 Stat. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b) (2) (1958). This provision requires notice and
hearing before the Board can exempt non-scheduled or daylight carriers from the requirements of
the Civil Aeronautics Act relating to wages and hours of pilQ" aod co-pilots.
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out that "Congress could hardly have made clearer its intention to
authorize the Board to grant, without hearing, exemptions from require-
ments of the Act which do not relate to pilots."'15
2. American Airlines v. CAB
Eastern was followed by the court in American Airlines v. CAB. "' In
that case, an intervening certified carrier sought an adjudicatory hearing
before the Board granted an exemption to a non-certified carrier to allow
it to carry the mails."' With respect to the contention the court stated:
"That the Board is required to hold an evidentiary hearing in proceedings
under Section 416(b), we refer again to the Eastern Airlines case . . .
wherein this court has disposed of this claim adversely to this conten-
tion..... Since the facts of the American case closely paralleled the Eastern
controversy,1 9 the decision in the later case did not expand upon the earlier
holding denying an evidentiary hearing prior to the granting of an exemp-
tion. Board attempts to deny evidentiary hearings in proceedings under
Section 416 other than the granting of an exemption form the basis for the
remainder of this discussion.
3. License Cases Distinguished
These exemption cases must be carefully distinguished from ostensibly
similar cases in which the court has required notice and hearing where
applications for licenses have been determined. The leading decision in this
field stated that denial of permission to practice before the United States
Board of Tax Appeals can be effective only after fair investigation, with
such notice, hearing, and opportunity to answer for the applicant as would
constitute due process." ' In a more recent case, the Supreme Court held
that, whether the practice of law be considered a right or a privilege, an
application for admission to the bar is governed by procedural due
process.
A hearing may nonetheless be denied to an applicant or an interested
party regarding the grant of an exemption. This is true because: (1) the
Board and the courts have refused to consider an exemption a license for
purposes of initial grant or denial, and (2) the decision by the CAB to
grant or deny an exemption is predicated upon considerations which are
general and legislative. It is settled that a tribunal may properly find such
facts without providing an opportunity for a trial type hearing."' While
the cited cases deal with rule-making determinations by administrative
agencies, the principle remains that if the facts upon which the agency
grounds its decision do not depend upon the particular qualifications of
the affected party, no evidentiary hearing is ordinarily required.
Discussing the second factor, it is immediately evident that the de-
11. Eastern Airlines v. CAB, 185 F.2d 426, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
"6 231 F.2d 483, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
117 The intervenor argued with considerable force that the Board had not made the requisite
findings of "undue burden" on the non-certified carrier to allow the Board to grant the exemption.
The dissenting judge agreed with this contention. Contra, Craig, A New Look at 416(b), 21 J.
Air L. & Com. 127 (1954).
11 American Airlines v. CAB, 231 F.2d 483, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
11' In both cases, an intervening carrier sought an adjudicatory hearing prior to the granting
of an exemption.
1" Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1925).
"' Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
'"E.g., Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441
(1915); bgwles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
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termination not to grant an exemption is based primarily on the state of
the national transportation scheme. Information pertaining to the public
interest is of chief concern for, whether or not the applicant is of limited
extent, the Board cannot grant an exemption unless it finds that the inter-
ests of interstate commerce and the nation's transportation requirements
necessitate the granting of the authority.' Such legislative facts are wholly
outside the competence of the applicant carrier to meet or to effectively
dispute, and the Supreme Court has recognized that if such information
does not pertain to the qualifications of particular applicants no evidentiary
hearing is necessary."
While it is laboring the obvious to point out again the unique character
of the exemption provision, nonetheless it is necessary to do so in order
to distinguish 416 cases which arise from grant or denial situations and
license cases. The Civil Aeronautics Act simply does not give any carrier,
whatever its qualifications, the right to an exemption; indeed, it is virtually
a contradiction in terms to make such a claim. On the other hand, the
Goldsmith case describes an applicant for admission as being "entitled"
to a license once certain facts are ascertained:
We think that the petitioner having shown by his application that, being a
citizen of the United States and a certified public accountant under the
laws of a State, he was within the class of those entitled to be admitted to
practice under the Board's rules, he should not have been rejected upon
charges of his unfitness without giving him an opportunity by notice for
hearing and answer."'
Similarly, the applicant for admission to the bar has a right to practice
if he is free from any disqualifying marks or attachments. But the CAB,
on the other hand, has the power to declare that in the future, no further
exemptions will be granted, regardless of the merits or the qualifications
of the applicants. Therefore, there is a very real distinction between
licensing cases and the cases which arise from the grant or denial of
exemptions under Section 416.
The Eastern decision is supportable on several grounds. Great difficulty
arises, however, when the CAB seeks to extend the holding in that case
to other situations beyond the bare granting or denial of an application
for an exemption.
B. Terminating An Individual Exemption
1. Standard Airlines v. CAB
126Pursuant to Section 416 and to the expressed intent of Congress, in
123E.g., American Airlines v. CAB, 231 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The Board's order
granting an exemption to non-certified carriers to enable those carriers to carry mail pending their
certification hearing was upheld by the court principally on the ground that the Board had made
a specific finding that the exemptions were in the public interest.
'"'Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). In this case, the
court evidently assumed that any secret information the President may have relied upon in denying
a certificate of convenience and necessity to an overseas carrier was relative to international relations
and thus properly found without the requirement of a trial type hearing.
i.. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1925).
126 See 83 Cong. Rec. 6407 (1938). The primary objectives of the economic regulatory powers
vested in the Board were the establishment of security of route as a basis for sound and orderly
development and the elimination of unrestricted and cutthroat competition. See also Hearings Before
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on H.R. 9738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 420-421
(1938).
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1938 the Board issued General Regulation 291127 which exempted from
certain provisions of Title IV carriers which operated on an irregular
or non-scheduled basis. In 1947, the Board adopted an amendment to that
regulation, which required irregular air carriers utilizing large aircraft to
obtain "Letters of Registration..... These letters were issued upon applica-
tion to those large irregular carriers which had previously been operating
under Regulation 291.1. The new feature of the letters of registration was
that the Board expressly reserved the power to suspend or revoke the letters
at any time.
Standard Airlines was an irregular air carrier operating under a letter of
registration. Due to consistent violations of its registration authority, the
Board suspended Standard's letter of registration without granting Stan-
dard an opportunity for a hearing.1"' The court reversed, concluding that
the suspension would destroy property, not license property but investment
and business property, and "in our jurisprudence an opportunity to present
arguments orally . . . is one of the rudiments of fair play required when
property has been taken or destroyed."'' The court briefly dismissed the
Board's contention that Standard had sought the letter of registration aware
of the possibility of suspension. The government, stated the court, cannot
make an otherwise unconstitutional and invalid requirement a condition
to a permit."'
To support its decision on what it considered the "practicalities" of the
situation, the court resorted to a somewhat tortured construction of the
Civil Aeronautics Act."' It noted that the other provisions of the Act
which deal with suspension require notice and hearing."' The only specific
authority granted to the Board for suspension without a hearing is Section
1005 (a)"'2 and this provision is expressly limited to emergencies affecting
public safety. The court therefore concluded that if Congress had intended
that suspension for an ordinary violation of the Act or regulations, not
so critical as safety emergencies, could be without a hearing, it would seem
that it would have made appropriate provision in Section 416(b) (1). It
did not do so."'
On the basis of the legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics Act and
the bare language of Section 416(b) (1), the opposite conclusion is per-
haps closer to the intent of Congress. Recalling the sweeping grant of
authority to regulate the irregular and exempt carriers under Section 416,
coupled with Board power under Section 205(a)"'. to make rules and
regulations consistent with the provisions of the Act, untrammelled
14 C.F.R. 291.1. No carrier is deemed within the irregular classification unless the services
offered and performed by it are of such infrequency as to preclude any implication of a uniform
pattern or normal consistency of operation.
.' 14 C.F.R. 292.1.
1" Standard Airlines, Inc., Exemption Request, 9 C.A.B. 583 (1948).
0 Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
21 Citing FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
12 The court did not have the bentfit of the Supreme Court's decision in the Yong Yang Sung
case (339 U.S. 3 (1949)). Rather than applying provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
to fill gaps in the Civil Aeronautics Act relating to required procedures, the Court of Appeals was
forced to an unrewarding construction of the Civil Aeronautics Act to support its decision.
'352 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1958); 52 Stat. 989 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §
1373 (f) (1958). The Board may suspend or cancel a permit to a foreign air carrier after notice
and hearing.
1452 Star. 1023 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1485(a) (1958).
... Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"" 52 Star. 984 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1958).
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Board discretion to regulate appears to have been the aim of Congress. The
adjoining paragraph, Section 416(b) (2), requires notice and hearing be-
fore the Board can exempt an air carrier from certain labor provisions of
the Act. In addition, whenever Congress referred to suspensory or revoca-
tion powers, it required notice and hearing, except in Section 416 (b) (1).
Congress clearly was cognizant of the hearing requirement, and specifi-
cally omitted including such a requirement in 416(b) (1).""a Thus the
provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act alone will not support a require-
ment that notice and hearing precede Board action in regard to an existing
exemption authority.
The court is far more persuasive in its view that fair play requires the
opportunity to present oral argument before a serious deprivation of
property can be effected. There is an assurance that contentions will be
heard and understood upon a verbal statement, a degree of certainty not
secured by the mere filing of written material. The decision emphasized
that the "controlling practicality," the loss of property without a hearing,
governed the outcome. The interpretation of the Act as requiring a hearing
is obviously a make-weight argument of little substance.
The utility of the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts
is presented by the Standard case. It is submitted the court reached the
correct decision, but did so on the basis of a spontaneous reaction. It then
groped for reasons to support its holding. The CAB had openly stated
that the grounds for terminating the exemption were past violations of
the carrier's letters of registration. Such facts are intrinsically the kind of
facts that ordinarily ought not to be determined without giving the affected
party the opportunity to challenge the evidence, if for no other reason
than that the affected party is in the best position to know about the
particular facts under investigation.
The Goldsmith case ' had stated that due process entitles a party, when
rejected on charges of unfitness, to an opportunity, by notice, for hearing
and answer. The same reasoning is applicable to the Standard case, for the
same issue of determination of adjudicative facts was presented. This then
was the basis for the court's decision in Standard, regardless of the statu-
tory interpretation language employed by the bench.
2. Cook Cleland Catalina Airways v. CAB
A later case supports this assertion. " In a factual situation similar to
the Standard Airlines case, but with one critical difference, the court held
that an exemption could be terminated without a hearing. Subsequent to
a revised regulation terminating the blanket exemptions to irregular air
carriers," Cook had sought to continue its operating authority under an
individual exemption. Petitioner's application for a continuation of its
exempt status was denied without a hearing. 4 ' The similarity of the instant
137 While it is true that Section 416 (b) (I) does not directly refer to Board powers of suspension
or revocation, Congress clearly intended for the Board to have such power under the exemption pro-
vision. If the Board did not retain such authority, continued control over exempted carriers would
not be possible.
... Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1925).
.. Cook Cleland Catalina Airways v. CAB, 195 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
'4' 14 C.F.R. 292.1. The new regulations terminated the letters of registration procedure which
had been followed since 1947 which had in effect given a blanket exemption to all irregular carriers,
since the letters were issued upon application. The new regulation enabled the Board to consider
and pass upon applications for exemptions on an individual basis.
I" The court followed the reasoning of the Eastern case (185 F.2d 426), and stated that the
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case to the Standard decision rests in the fact that in both cases the Board
sought to terminate an existing operating authority without a hearing.
In Cook, however, no existing business and no existing property were in-
volved. Petitioners had never engaged in operations from the date of the
issuance of its letter of registration to the denial of its claim for continued
exemption. If the Act demanded a hearing prior to the termination of a
carrier's authority under Section 416, as the court in Standard had opined,
a hearing would have been required in the Cook case, since this is exactly
what happened in the latter case. Read together, Cook and Standard
reveal that the Civil Aeronautics Act does not , but that due process may,
require a hearing prior to the termination of an exemption."
Petitioners made a second contention in Cook which requires considera-
tion. The carrier sought an adjudicatory hearing on the further ground
that its "license" was revoked. This marked the first time that a holder
of an exemption sought protection under Section 2 (e) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act defining licensees and Section 2 (d) requiring an
adjudicatory order prior to final agency disposition, whether affirmative
or negative, regarding such a license." In this case, the court denied
the carrier's claim to licensee status, holding that the "license" was merely
permission to operate under a blanket exemption, and no hearing is re-
quired in respect to such exemptions.
The Cook decision is clearly on tenuous grounds. If the Civil Aero-
nautics Act is to be construed as not, by its terms, requiring a hearing in
regard to proceedings under Section 416; and if holders of exemption
authority are not to be given licensee protection, subsequent cases may be
decided on an ad hoc basis determined on due process grounds by the
existing property or business investment. Fortunately, both Standard and
Cook were easy cases to decide: the former carrier clearly had a substantial
investment in danger of being destroyed by Board action without an op-
portunity for a hearing; the latter had nothing to lose but a paper authori-
zation. A considerable shadow area exists, however, between the two ex-
tremes. What, for example, would be a sufficient investment in business
or property to require an evidentiary hearing prior to alteration or suspen-
sion of the carrier's exemption status? Cook Airways had submitted plans
for future expansion as a justification for continued existence. Would one
contract, obligating the carrier to future performance and stipulating
damages for non-performance, be an investment worthy of protection?
"Controlling practicalities," (which simply means "need for Constitutional
protection"), the announced ground for decision in the Standard case and
the inarticulate basis for the holding in Cook, is no guide.
On the other hand, evidentiary hearings for each of the one hundred
same rule applies to the denial of a claim for an exemption as the court applied in Eastern, where
an intervenor sought to prevent a grant of an exemption. In either case, concluded the court,
the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act have no applicability to exemption
proceedings under Section 416.
Considering the facts of the Cook case, the language of the court is excessively broad and cer-
tainly misleading. In fact, the Board could be misled into thinking that it had greater power to deal
with exemption holders than the facts of the cases relied upon warranted (see Ch. IV C and D
infra pp. 281, 287.).
12 The court noted, in Cook (195 F.2d 206, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1952)): "We do not have here
any question which might arise if the applicant had developed a business or acquired property by
reason of the original registration or original permissive regulations of the Board [citing to the
Standard case].14360 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d), (e) (1958). See also supra note 75.
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applicants for individual exemptions following the termination of blanket
exemptions would tie up the Board for years. The critical gap between the
due process requirements of the Constitution and the sheer administrative
necessity of processing and determining scores of applications was never
more in evidence than in the turmoil surrounding the irregular air carriers.
Because of blatant violations by these carriers, the Board had to revise its
method of controlling and regulating their operations. This necessitated
altering their exemption authority. Cook was only to be the opening
skirmish in a decade of controversy.
3. American Air Transport Revocation Proceedings
Considering the problems facing the CAB, it is not surprising that the
Board interpreted the Eastern and Cook decisions as giving it full authority
to control the destiny of the irregular air carriers unfettered by the pro-
cedural technicalities of the Administrative Procedure Act or the Civil
Aeronautics Act:
The Administrative Procedure Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act do not
of themselves require an adjudicatory hearing prior to the adoption of
regulations which grant, terminate, modify or otherwise condition an
exemption ... [citing to Cook]. Nor do we believe the Constitution guaran-
tees any hearing, much less an adjudicatory one, before an administrative
agency, prior to legislative action upon consideration of regulatory policy
of future applicability."
This point marks the end of the beginning. Misconstrued authority in
hand, the Board will now seek to manipulate all the irregular air carriers
in one proceeding: granting exemptions, modifying exemptions, and termi-
nating exemptions under the rule-making provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
C. Adjudication By Rule Making: Administrative Necessity Versus
Due Process
1. "Important Question" Inconclusively Determined: American Air
Transport v. CAB
The cases heretofore considered have dealt with Board exemption prac-
tice in regard to an individual carrier. Following the revision of the
irregular air carrier regulations in 1949,45 the Board realized that a more
expeditious method of handling exemption applications must be devised.
The Board processed the numerous applications for individual exemp-
tions in the first Large Irregular Air Carrier case.'" Ninety-six applica-
tions for exemptions were received from holders of letters of registration.
The Board, pursuant to the rule-making provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act,47 published general notice of the proposed changes in the
regulations and afforded all interested parties opportunity to participate in
the rule-making through submission of written data. The Board examined
the applications, all information submitted therewith including voluminous
flight and statistical reports, and on the basis of this analysis denied the
applications of all the large irregular air carriers which had systematically
'"American Air Transport, Revocation Proceedings, 16 C.A.B. 294, 299 n.8 (1952). Note
that the Board apparently ignores the Standard decision, rendered in 1947.
141 14 C.F.R. 292.1.
'4611 C.A.B. 609 (1950).
14760 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. S 1003 (1958).
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abused and violated the prohibition against regular route service.' Ex-
emptions were granted only to those carriers which had conducted truly
irregular service.
In addition to the restrictions on regularity which had been in effect,
the Board imposed a further limit on the exempted carriers by permitting
only three flights in the same direction between certain major cities during
any period of four successive calendar weeks, and only eight flights in the
same direction during such period between any other pair of cities.'
American Air Transport, an "irregular" carrier which had made 613
flights between New York and Miami in 1950, sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of the Board order limiting the number of flights between major
cities. The District Court issued an injunction on the grounds that the
regulation was void because adopted without such a hearing as required
under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act.'
The Board appealed."'
It was stipulated that the Board had properly followed the rule-making
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act."' The Board had heard
oral argument but had not required any of the testimony or oral presen-
tation to be made under oath. Nor had the Board permitted any person
to call witnesses, to cross-examine any person, or to offer competent evi-
dence in explanation or in rebuttal. Further, the Board agreed that the new
regulations limiting the petitioner's operations would in fact "seriously
injure and perhaps in large part destroy their business and property inter-
ests.""' The Board argued that regardless of the regulation's effect on par-
ticular carriers, the regulation represents "legislative" or rule-making
action rather than adjudication of individual rights. The regulation was
nonpunitive in character and predicated upon considerations of policy
to be applied in the future to all members of a classification of carriers.
Neither the Civil Aeronautics Act, the Administrative Procedure Act,
nor the Constitution guarantees an evidentiary hearing to affected persons
prior to the taking of "legislative" action by an administrative agency.
Since Congress would have been under no duty to grant an evidentiary
hearing prior to defining the extent to which air operations would be per-
mitted without compliance with the certificate provisions of the Civil
Aeronautics Act, and since Congress had delegated this authority to the
CAB under Section 416, the Board has similar freedom." '
The appellee relied heavily on the Standard decision,"' claiming that the
Board in effect was confiscating substantial business and property invest-
ment without an adjudicatory hearing required by the Civil Aeronautics
Act and the Administrative Procedure Act."' Furthermore, the carrier
claimed "licensee" status under Section 2 (e) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, noting that its title as an "exemption holder" should not change
""Large Irregular Air Carrier Case, 11 C.A.B. 609, 618. For the definition of "regular
service," see 14 C.F.R. 291.1 (supra note 127).
149 Large Irregular Air Carrier Case, 11 C.A.B. 609, 619 (1950).
'"American Air Transport v. CAB, 98 F. Supp. 660 (D.C.D.C. 1951).
". CAB v. American Air Transport, 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952), certificate dismissed, 344
U.S. 4 (1952).
... CAB v. American Air Transport, 201 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
"'3 Id. at 192.
'"Brief for Appellant, pp. 9, 15, CAB v. American Air Transport, 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir.
1952).
..' Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
'"Brief for Appellee, p. 4, CAB v. American Air Transport, 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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the application of recognized legal principles requiring notice, hearing, and
opportunity to comply prior to the amendment or termination of a
license. ' The court assumed that if the new regulation should legally be
regarded as amending existing licenses, adjudicatory hearings for the bene-
fit of existing licensees were necessary. But a majority of the court was un-
able to agree upon a disposition of the case, although the court was
"unanimously of the opinion that the question presented was of far-
reaching and fundamental importance in the field of administrative law.....
One judge voted to affirm the District Court's injunction for the fol-
lowing reasons:
The new Regulation inserts into the appelees' pre-existing licenses a crippling
limitation of the number of irregular trips permitted thereunder, the license
theretofore having been unrestricted in that respect, which will substantially
injure and in large part destroy the existing property and business of the
appellees. . . .The insertion of such a restriction into the license originally
unrestricted constitutes an amendment of the license which, under the
Constitution and the statutes is invalid without an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding." 9
One judge voted to reverse the order of the District Court on these
grounds:
When licenses are issued under a regulation of a licensing agency, an amend-
ment of the regulation which defines its terms in ways not shown to be
arbitrary or capricious, duly adopted by a rule-making procedure and with-
out an adjudicatory proceeding as to any affected license, is not to be regarded
as amending licenses and is valid although it will have the effect of destroying
substantial parts of the business of licensees."'
The third judge voted to remand the case to the District Court, and
was of the opinion:
(1) that the decisive question is whether the specific prescriptions of the
new Regulations are or are not a proper, or reasonable definition of the
undefined terms (barring flights which operated with "regularity or with a
reasonable degree of regularity") of the original licenses, and (2) that the
question is a question of fact which must be determined upon factual criteria
devised from studies of actual operations of regular and of irregular carriers
similar to the criteria utilized by the three judge court in Brady Transfer and
Storage Co. v. U.S.' or like purposes under the Motor Carrier Act, and
17 Id. at 5.
"a CAB v. American Air Transport, 201 F.2d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
1"9 Id. at 193.
' o Ibid.
'e' 80 F. Supp. 110 (D.C. S.D. Iowa 1948), aff1d, 335 U.S. 875 (1948). Since the American
Air Transport case was eventually remanded to the District Court on the strength of the opinion
of the judge who originally voted for remand, the criteria discussed in Brady Transfer and Storage
bears examination. Pursuant to Section 304(b) of the Motor Carrier Act, the Interstate Commerce
Commission had established two classes of carriers, regular and irregular, and had prescribed
different regulations for each class. One of the issues in the Brady case was whether the ICC,
in a rule-making proceeding, had created a reasonable classification between regular and irregular
route operators.
The ICC had announced eight criteria for determining the type of operation conducted by a
carrier. No one criterion would necessarily be controlling. The criteria were: predetermined plan;
character of traffic; solicitation; terminals and call stations; fixed routes; fixed termini; periodicity
of service; and schedules or their equivalent (80 F. Supp. 110, 115 n.4).
The court found that these criteria did not constitute any new definition of an irregular route
carrier, but merely enumerated the historically established differences in the type of operations
long known and recognized by the industry. It concluded, therefore, that the classification was a
reasonable one fully authorized by well recognized principles of law (80 F. Supp. 110, 116).
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similar to the data which the Board says it used in formulating the Regula-
tion here involved. Since the present record contains no evidence of that
sort, this judge would remand the case to the trial court for the receipt of
such evidence and a finding of basic facts and an ultimate finding therefrom
as to whether the new Regulation does or does not in fact change the terms
of the existing licenses.'
Deadlocked, the Court of Appeals requested the instructions of the
Supreme Court upon the following question:
Where an operating authority is granted by a regulatory agency and a private
company operating thereunder acquires property and business in so doing, is a
new regulation of the agency which in fact substantially injures or in a large
part destroys such property interests or business-
(1) void as to that licensee unless an adjudicatory hearing is held, because it
is on its face an amendment of his license; or
(2) valid if adopted by a rule-making proceeding, provided the new
regulation merely defines the terms of the old in ways not shown to be
arbitrary or capricious; or
(3) does its validity as to that licensee depend upon a finding of fact that
it does or does not in fact vary the terms of the license; or
(4) does its validity depend upon some other condition?163
The Supreme Court dismissed the certificate." 4 In a per curiam decision,
from which Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, the court noted that if it
granted the Board's application for an order requiring the Court of
Appeals to send up the record, the entire matter in controversy would be
before the court for decision. The unsigned opinion stated that since the
Supreme Court does not normally review orders of administrative agencies
in the first instance, the high court did not want to take any action which
might foreclose the possibility of review in the Court of Appeals. The
decision suggested that perhaps the Court of Appeals might wish to hear
the case en banc to resolve the deadlock.
The Court of Appeals, the same judges sitting,' unanimously voted to
remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings in accord-
ance with the opinion of the judge who originally voted for remand.' 6
No further record of the proceedings was made."7
2. The Case Revisited
The impact of the instant case is not easy to measure. The Board had
attempted to destroy the complaining carrier by revising its operating
162 CAB v. American Air Transport, 201 F.2d 189, 193-194 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
163 Id. at 194.
"64CAB v. American Air Transport, 344 U.S. 4 (1952).
16. Judges Edgerton, Prettyman and Miller sat on the American Air Transport case. The
opinions were unsigned, yet it is perhaps interesting to speculate as to which judge authored which
opinion, particularly in the light of past decisions by the same judges. Judge Edgerton wrote the
Eastern decision, and concurred in Cook. He thus becomes my candidate for the opinion in American
Air Transport which sought to reverse the District Court. Judge Prettyman wrote the Standard
and the Cook decisions, and the language of the opinion in American Air Transport which would
affirm the injunction issued by the District Court closely resembles the tenor of the Standard
holding. On these shaky grounds, Judge Prettyman would appear to have written the opinion
affirming the District Court. The process of elimination reveals Judge Miller as the author of the
"compromise" opinion, which eventually prevailed.
166CAB v. American Air Transport, 201 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
167 The Board subsequently revoked American Air Transport's operating authority for wilful
violations of a cease and desist order. American Air Transport, Revocation Proceedings, 16 C.A.B.
294 (1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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authority through the rule-making procedure. A later case cited American
Air Transport for the proposition that "an interest may merit legal con-
sideration even when the investment is made freely and with knowledge of
a possible change in status that would impair its use.' '.. Yet certainly
American Air Transport expanded upon the rationale of the Standard
decision,6 9 which was confined to the above mentioned rudimentary due
process considerations. The court in the American Air Transport case re-
manded to determine whether the new regulation did or did not in fact
"change the terms of existing licenses.'... If the new regulation was found
to change existing licenses, the court was unanimous in agreeing that an
adjudicatory hearing was required. Rule-making procedures would be
sufficient only if the new regulation was found to be a reasonable definition
of the undefined term "regularity."
On the question of regularity, the reference by the remanding judge to
the criteria employed in the Brady Transfer and Storage'7' case is vulner-
able to criticism. The Supreme Court previously had warned against
analogies or references to other modes of transport when air trans-
port problems arose.'' The critical feature of the formula employed by
the ICC was that the standards in effect codified historical practices in the
motor carrier industry.' But there were no comparable historical standards
in the aviation industry. Irregular air service on any scale was hardly five
years in operation when the Board considered the first Large Irregular Air
Carrier case.' The ICC criteria determining regularity evolved after
forty years of interstate motor carriage and have doubtful relevance to
singular air transportation problems.
On the other hand, prior to the American Air Transport case, the Board
had established precedent on the question of regularity which was ap-
parently ignored by the remanding judge. In 1947 the Board had set up
criteria which must be met if the operations were to be considered irregular:
(1) Flights between designated points, whether one or more per week, must
be staggered as to the days of the week in successive weeks;
(2) if more than one flight is to be operated per week in successive weeks,
not only must such flights vary as to the days of the week, but there must
also be breaks in the continuity of service for a week or approximately that
period during which no flights are operated between these same points; and,
(3) the flights must be of such infrequency as to preclude any implication
of a normal pattern or normal consistency of operations between the same
points." 5
166Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Summerfield, 229 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The
petitioning railroad sought to enjoin the Postmaster General from continuing an experimental
plan which authorized air carriers to transport surface mail. By statute, 39 Stat. 428 (1916),
39 U.S.C. § 6203 (1960), the railroads are required to carry such mail as may be offered for
transportation by the Postmaster General, and a necessary effect of the experiment was to prevent
useful employment of parts of a very considerable investment. The court found the interest of
the plaintiff railroad merited legal consideration (citing also Standard Airlines v. CAB, 177 F.2d
18 (D.C. Cir. 1947)).
169 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also note 130 supra and accompanying text.
970 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See also note 162 supra and accompanying text.
' See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
..'Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). See also note 7
supra and accompanying text.
'" See note 161 supra.
174 11 C.A.B. 609 (1950).
"' Matter of Non-Certified Operations of Trans-Caribbean Air Cargo Lines, Inc., CAB
Docket No. 2593 (March 14, 1947).
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American Air Transport, it will be recalled, completed 613 flights be-
tween New York and Miami in 1950.176 Under any reasonable definition
of regularity, that carrier must be considered a blatant violator of the
regulation. Other irregular carriers were operating with varying degrees
of regularity and many operations closely approached the new standard.
Compliance would cause little hardship to these carriers.
3. Licensee Status Conferred on Carrier
By remanding the case, the Court of Appeals expressed disagreement
with the District Court's injunction invalidating the regulation as it
applied to all irregular carriers. There seems to be no reason why the
regulation should be invalidated where it simply redefines the authority
held by a carrier. Assuming that all the irregular carriers held licenses,
those carriers which were already operating on a truly irregular basis
suffered de minimus losses, if at all, from the imposition of the new
standards. Thus, as to those carriers, even though considered licensees, rule-
making procedures were perfectly proper since the Board had merely re-
defined their authority and no "amendment" of their license had taken
place.
Paradoxically, the fact that American Air Transport was so notorious
a violator gave that carrier greater protection under the Administrative
Procedure Act. For as to American, the new standards could hardly be
found to have merely "redefined" its operating status. As the Board con-
ceded, these new regulations would clearly put that carrier out of busi-
ness, and they were probably intended, to accomplish just that end. But
since the disparity between the services being performed by American
and the new standards was so great, the inarticulate grounds for the Court
of Appeals' decision must be that intervening Administrative Procedure
Act requirements regarding licensees bar rule-making as the basis for so
altering that carrier's authority.
Indeed, it is essential that the court assumes the licensee status of the
complaining carrier. Otherwise the remand would not be supportable,
for if the affected carriers were not licensees, the new regulations would
simply be valid exercises of the Board's rule-making power. The fact that
the new rule seriously impaired some carriers' operating authority would
not have any legal ramifications, i.e., no one carrier had been discriminated
against nor had there been any attempt to single out violators.' 7 In fact,
it had been conceded that if rule-making was the proper procedure under
the circumstances, then the carrier had received all that it was entitled to
in the way of hearing and argument.
But once the court finds that the complaining carrier holds a license,
rule-making becomes an improper method of altering the licensee's au-
thority, except if the new rule merely redefines the licensee's authority.
Clearly, American Air Transport's operating authority had suffered more
than a mere redefinition. It is true that a wilful violator, such as
American, although termed a licensee, cannot avail itself of the protective
features of Section 9 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.' The
176 See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
177 See Ch. IV E infra p. 292 for an analysis of a valid rule-making proceeding.
17860 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b) (1958). Section 9(b) provides that before any
sanction or any withdrawal, suspension, or revocation affect a license holder, notice of the
violation plus an opportunity to comply must be given the holder. However, this protection does
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Board is still free to bring a proceeding to terminate American's operating
authority without giving the carrier an opportunity to comply with the
new regulation. But, to terminate the authority held by a licensee, an ad-
judicatory proceeding must be followed. 9 American does not acquire a
favored status because of the wilful nature of its violations; but limits
are placed on the power of an agency to drastically alter operations licensed
under permissive agency regulations. Thus the new regulation limiting
flights between major cities can validly be invoked via the rule-making
procedures where such limits historically have been followed by the
affected carriers.' However, where the otherwise "reasonable" changes in
standards materially alter or destroy the license of certain carriers, the
Board is forced to proceedings in regard to those carriers which guarantee
greater protection from arbitrary administrative action and which con-
form to the Administrative Procedure Act.
A 1961 decision"'. interpreted American Air Transport as involving an
effort by the Board to separate the sheep from the goats: to let the large
irregular carriers which had obeyed the spirit and letter of the Board's
regulations remain in business undisturbed, while limiting the operations
of those which had violated the authority given them. The court drew
the inference, substantiated by the previous analysis, that if the Board
proposed to discriminate between carriers in the same group, characterizing
some as law-abiders and some as law-breakers, it would be required to
afford an evidentiary hearing to those whose operating authority was to
be suspended or revoked for cause."'
D. Licensee Protection Denied To Exemption Holder
1. Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB
The Board successfully terminated the exemption authority of an irregu-
lar air carrier through the rule-making procedure in the most recent and
perhaps final case in the long controversy surrounding the irregular car-
riers."' Unconcerned by the implications of the American Air Transport
not extend to wilful violators of the statute or regulation. See Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 387
(1961).
1960 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d), (e) (1958). See also note 75 supra and accom-
panying text.
"'°See, e.g., criteria discussed in the Brady Transfer and Storage case, note 161 supra and
accompanying text.
"' Capitol Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 292 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also discussion of this
case in Ch. IV E infra p. 292.
112 Id. at 758.
... It is no exaggeration to state that the Board's experience in seeking to regulate the irregular
air carriers has been a study in futility. In the second Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation
(22 C.A.B. 838 (1955)), forty-nine large irregular carriers were granted authority to conduct: (1)
unlimited charter operations in domestic areas; (2) charter operations for carriage of passengers in
international operations on an individual exemption basis; and (3) individually ticketed passenger
flights not to exceed ten trips per month between any two points. The carriers were given interim
exemptions pending individual hearings on their applications.
The power of the Board to grant exemptions where no "undue burden" on the exempted carrier
is shown was challenged in American Airlines v. CAB (235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). The court
reversed the Board order granting exemptions to large irregular carriers, stating that the Board had
failed to make the finding, required by Section 416, that certification proceedings would be "an
undue burden" on the carriers. The case was remanded to the Board to show facts to support its
conclusion. The court stayed its judgment invalidating the Board's order until sixty days after
the Board's final decision on the matter (1957 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 34).
In 1959, in the third Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation (28 C.A.B. 224 (1959)) the
Board tried a new tactic. It granted limited certificates of convenience to the irregular (now called
supplemental) carriers. The ten trip limit was incorporated in the operating authority conferred
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decision, the court refused to grant the complaining carriers licensee status
under Section 2 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, and allowed
the CAB to terminate the exemption authority of Great Lakes Airlines
without an adjudicatory hearing." ' Petitioners in this case were unsuccess-
ful applicants for final authority to perform supplemental air service. '
The Board found that these carriers had violated provisions of the Federal
Aeronautics Act (previously the Civil Aeronautics Act) and the Board's
regulations, thus exhibiting a lack of "compliance disposition" which
disqualified them for final authority as supplemental carriers.' 6 The
Board cancelled the "interim" exemption authority under which the car-
riers had been operating in the general rule-making proceeding held to
determine the regulations which govern supplemental carriage.
Petitioners argued that the operating authority they possessed was a
"license" which could be cancelled only after a compliance proceeding
under Section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, ' had been
brought against them and they had been given an opportunity to conform
their conduct to the Board's regulations.
The court rejected the carrier's contention on two grounds: first, as-
suming, arguendo, that the carriers did have "licenses," they were tempor-
ary and conditional. They were not withdrawn, suspended or revoked
within the meaning of Section 9 (b) ; they expired or terminated by their
own terms.' Second, Section 9 (b) does not apply to temporary licenses,
so, even if the action of the Board could be construed to be a withdrawal,
suspension, or revocation of the carrier's authority within the meaning of
9 (b), these petitioners were not aided."88 It is submitted that the court
was incorrect on both grounds and that the carrier's operating authority
was invalidly terminated.
It is true, as the court pointed out, that there was no guarantee during
the years in which irregular or supplemental service was permitted under
on the carriers. This plan was also reversed by the court in United Airlines v. CAB (278 F.2d 446
(D.C. Cir. 1960)). The court held that the limit on flight operations violated Section 401 (e) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)), which specifically states that "no term,
condition, or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air carrier to add to or
change schedules .. "
Congress immediately passed Public Law 86-661 (74 Stat. 527 (July 14, 1960)) which preserved
the status quo for a limit of two years to enable Congress to enact new legislation giving the
Board power to deal with the supplementals.
The Supreme Court thereupon granted certiorari on the United case, vacated the judgment
and remanded with instructions to retain jurisdiction until such time as Public Law 86-661 expired
or new legislation was enacted (364 U.S. 297 (1960)).
Public Law 57-528 (76 Stat. 143 (July 10, 1962)) terminated twelve years of controversy by
permitting the Board to issue limited certification to supplemental carriers (49 U.S.C. § 1371(n)
which can be revoked or suspended only after notice and hearing (49 U.S.C. § 1371 (n) (3), (5).
See also, Note, 28 J. Air L. & Com. 453 (1962).
184 Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Fahy, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961).
185 The applications were denied by the CAB in Order No. E-13436, (Jan. 28, 1959).
36 Great Lakes Airlines, Inc., et. al., Enforcement Proceedings, 29 C.A.B. 1197 (1959).
18760 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b) (1958). The second sentence of Section 9(b)
states:
Except in cases of wilfulness or those in which public health, interest, or safety re-
quires otherwise, no withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or annulment of any license
shall be lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency proceedings therefor, facts
or conduct which may warrant such action shall have been called to the attention of
the licensee by the agency in writing and the licensee shall have been accorded oppor-
tunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements.
'88Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"I Id. at 223.
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the exemption provision that final authorization would be granted. But,
query: does this fact give the Board power to terminate the authority of
a particular carrier in a rule-making proceeding? Great Lakes Airlines had
been operating under successive forms of exemption authority since 1946.
The court described this operation as wholly "at the sufferance of the
Board." This appears a rather inaccurate description in the light of the
Standard decision, 9 ' which forced the Board to an adjudicatory hearing
when it sought to terminate the authority of a carrier which had made
a substantial investment on the basis of its exemption status.
Describing the carrier's operating authority as "at the sufferance of the
Board" not only appears inaccurate, it would seem to directly conflict with
the holding of the court in American Air Transport."' All three judges
on that court found that the irregular carriers had licensee status, and the
bench ultimately agreed that only a reasonable amendment of their oper-
ating authority could be accomplished absent an evidentiary hearing. Any
further alteration of their status must be accompanied by a hearing pur-
suant to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act respecting
the change of a licensee's authority. Yet in the instant case, the court
sanctioned not merely the alteration of Great Lakes' operating authority,
but permitted the Board to terminate the exemption under which the
carrier had operated for sixteen years without giving that carrier an evi-
dentiary hearing on its alleged violations.'9'
In a revealing footnote, the court was relieved to find that it was not
"faced with the question whether in a rule-making proceeding the Board
could have revoked all prior operating authority for all non-scheduled or
supplemental carriers."'' . But clearly, what the court was faced with was
the termination, by Board action, of an individual carrier's operating au-
thority under rule-making procedures. This was true whether the Board
order was considered a revocation of a license, a denial of an application
for a new license, or a refusal to renew present operating authority. "The
essence of the matter, both procedurally and substantively, [was] that
petitioner's licenses [were] terminated."
94
Thus the first ground proferred by the court to uphold the Board's
action, that the license "expired by its own terms," is without substance.
Great Lakes' exemption authority was not a thirty-day permit to fly mili-
tary charters. Such a permit would "expire by its own terms." On the
contrary, the expiration of the petitioner's authority was predicated upon
a Board determination that Great Lakes was unfit or unqualified for final
authorization. While the Board clearly has the power to reach such a
conclusion, it cannot do so without granting the affected carrier an evi-
dentiary hearing."'
The second ground upon which the court based its holding is also open
to grave criticism. For the proposition that Section 9 (b) of the Admin-
190 Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also note 130 supra and
accompanying text.
191 See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
192 See note 207 infra.
13 Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217, 223 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The implication
being that a rule-making proceeding wiping out all the supplemental carriers might be highly
suspect.
". Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Fahy, J., dissenting).
' Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949); American Air Transport v.
CAB, 201 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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istrative Procedure Act does not refer to temporary licenses, the court
relied heavily on extracts from the legislative history of the Act. Both
the Senate"' and the House'. reports do contain statements to the effect
that Section 9(b) was not intended to apply to temporary licenses. Ap-
pended to the Senate Report is a letter from the Attorney General to the
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, containing the following
commentary on Senate bill 7, the bill that developed into the Administrative
Procedure Act: "The second sentence of subsection (b) [of Section 9] is
not intended to apply to temporary licenses which may be issued pending
the determination of applications for licenses."'' 8 In the first place, to
term Great Lakes' fifteen year exemption authority a "temporary permit
pending the determination of its application for a license" is stretching
the meaning of "pending application." It is far more consonant with
the purposes of the Act and with the intent of Congress to consider
temporary permits to be only very limited grants of authority permitting
an applicant to engage in business or operations while the agency is con-
sidering its application for a license. If the agency decides against licensing
the applicant, it need not be tied to strict adjudicatory or evidentiary pro-
cedures to get back the temporary license. The applicant, on its part, has
full knowledge of the precarious nature of its position and conducts its
business accordingly.
Great Lakes Airlines did not apply for permanent authority until the
Board announced that exemption status for large supplementals was no
longer possible and that the carriers must seek certification. 9' At this point,
Great Lakes had been operating for twelve years. To construe its authority
as a temporary permit subject to being revoked at any time without a
hearing is contrary to the reasoning of the Standard and American Air
Transport cases and to the intent of Congress in granting procedural pro-
tection to license holders.
The above analysis assumes that no judicial gloss had been placed on
the relation between temporary permits and Section 9 (b) of the Act.
This, however, is not the case. The Supreme Court has conferred licensee
status (and thus required opportunity for compliance prior to revocation)
upon the holder of a 180 day permit granted by the ICC pending de-
termination of the carrier's application for permanent operating author-
ity.20 Thus, the minimum interpretation advanced in the preceding para-
graphs has been carried even further by the Supreme Court. The court
construed the 180 day permit as a "license" under Section 2(e) of the
Act and thus made available to the carrier the protection of the third
sentence of Section 9(b)."' A temporary permit, stated the court, such
196S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); A.P.A. Legis. Hist. 212 (1946).
197 H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1946); A.P.A. Legis. Hist. 275 (1946).
"8 A.P.A. Legis. Hist. 229 (1946). The court also found support for its holding in the
Attorney General's Manual on the A.P.A., wherein it is stated: "Such [temporary] permits or
licenses may be revoked without 'another chance' regardless of whether the public safety, health,
or interest is involved." (at 91).
19 See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
2"°Pan At. S.S. Corp. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 353 U.S. 436 (1957). Section 311(a) of the
Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 911(a)) gives the ICC power to grant "temporary
authority" to a common carrier by water or a contract carrier by water to institute service for
which "there is an immediate and urgent need." The section provides that the temporary
authority "shall be valid for such time as the Commission shall specify, but not for more than
180 days."
P' 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b) (1958). The third sentence of Section 9(b) pro-
vides that:
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as the 180 day authority granted by the ICC, covers an "activity of a
continuing nature" and therefore is a "permit" or "certificate" under the
Act. The holder is thus entitled to the protection of 9 (b)."' This section
was construed as supplementing Section 311(a) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act and to apply to temporary as well as permanent licenses.!0 a
While the Pan Atlantic decision construed the third sentence of 9(b),
and the Great Lakes case is concerned with the second sentence of that
provision, the Supreme Court looked to Section 2 (e) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act for a definition of the term "license." Since 2 (e)
definitions were clearly intended by Congress to assure uniform interpreta-
tion of the defined terms throughout the Act, the court's holding in the
Pan Atlantic case would require that the second sentence of 9 (b) also
be applicable to temporary permits.'"
It has been suggested that the "opportunity to comply" provisions of
Section 9(b) have no application where the continued operation by the
licensee is no longer in the public interest, convenience or necessity."0
Since the revocation or termination of the license would be based on
factors outside the carrier's control,0 s the carrier could not possibly act
to remedy the situation even if it were given the opportunity to do so.
Therefore, had the Board determined that the services rendered by
Great Lakes were no longer required by the national transportation scheme,
no preliminary warning would have had to be given the carrier to enable
it to achieve compliance. However, the Board's stated grounds for revoca-
tion or termination were past violations.0 7 In either case, an evidentiary
hearing on the substantive issue is required by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act prior to suspension or revocation of a license, whether that
issue be the public necessity for service or violations of the statute.
In the Great Lakes case, the Board successfully was able to "weed out"
the petitioner from the list of operating carriers without giving the carrier
an adjudicatory hearing. The rule-making procedures were thus utilized
to adjudicate the merits of an individual carrier and to terminate the
operating authority of an alleged violator without giving that violator an
adjudicatory hearing required by due process and therefore by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.2 ' The procedures denied to the Board in
Standard and American Air Transport were upheld in Great Lakes.
In any case in which the licensee has, in accordance with agency rules, made timely
and sufficient application for a renewal or new license, no license with reference to
any activity of a continuing nature shall expire until such application shall have been
finally determined by the agency.
"'Pan Atl. S.S. Corp. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 353 U.S. 436, 439 (1957).
20a Mr. Justice Burton, with Mr. Justice Harland and Mr. Justice Whittaker, dissented. The
dissenters stressed the unconditional maximum time limit incorporated in Section 311(a) of the
Interstate Commerce Act and the absence of any license status in the temporary authority held by
the petitioner.
2
"Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 385 (1961).
205 Ibid.
206 E.g., where there is no longer sufficient demand for services.
207 Still a third departure from the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act was
condoned by the court in regard to notice of violations. While Great Lakes was notified that
previous violations would be considered relative to the carrier's compliance posture, no specific
charges of violations were made prior to the hearing. The violations were first specified by the
hearing examiners in their decision. On appeal, the Board refused to re-open the record to hear
further testimony on the violations found by the hearing examiners. This failure violated Section
9(b) by not granting a license holder a second chance to achieve compliance before the institution
of agency proceedings leading to suspension or revocation.
'08 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1949),
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E. Valid Rule-Making By The Board
1. Capitol Airways v. CAB
An example of a valid rule-making proceeding followed by the Board,
which nonetheless seriously affected the operating authority of certain
carriers, was the Capitol Airways v. CAB case." 9 In this case, the Board,
in effect, redrew the rules of the game but left all the competitors in the
field.
In 1953, under its exemption power, the CAB had promulgated Part
294 of its economic regulations,210 which authorized air carriers of all cate-
gories to perform certain services for the military without obtaining prior
authorization from the Board. As originally issued, 294 contained several
restrictions on the operations carriers could provide. These restrictions were
lifted by two Exemption orders.. issued in 1959 and 1960, both of which
contained the expiration date of September 30, 1960.
In July, 1960, the Board issued a notice of proposed rule-making with
the announced purpose of repealing Part 294-the basic exemption pro-
vision. This section was to be replaced by the procedure followed by the
Board prior to 1953: granting individual exemptions to particular carriers
for particular items of military transportation.212 The petitioning carrier
sought renewal of the temporary exemption as it applied to Capitol and
a hearing on its petition. The Board denied both requests and the airline
appealed.
The Board had determined that as a matter of regulatory policy, in light
of changing conditions, that it was no longer desirable to issue blanket ex-
emptions. An unstated ground for this decision may have been several dis-
asters which had occurred on military charter flights. The determination
to revert back to a prior practice was made without prejudice to the dis-
position of future individual applications and, therefore, did not amount
to a decision on the merits of any particular carrier."'
The court conceded, as well it must, that the line between rule-making
and adjudication was not always easy to draw. In the instant case, some
carriers will be able to survive under the new rule, and some will not; but
no attempt was made to say that the petitioner, or any other carrier, were
violators of the law and thus not qualified for future authority. In con-
trast to the American Air Transport and Great Lakes cases, the impact of
the present decision by the Board was on an entire class, rather than on
particular members of the class which were singled out as violators, or
labeled for some reason as unfit or unworthy. For this reason, the pro-
cedures followed by the Board were correctly affirmed by the court.
The Capitol case illustrates clearly Professor Davis' suggested dichotomy
between legislative and adjudicative facts." The facts upon which the
Board based its change in practice did not pertain to the parties or their
conduct, but related to general questions of policy which were outside the
control of the affected parties. Cross-examination and sworn testimony are
patently inappropriate unless particularized issues of fact are disputed.
19292 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
10 18 Fed. Reg. 3639.
"' Order No. E-14484 (Sept. 25, 1959); Order No. E-15151 (April 26, 1960).
212 Order No. E-1 5769 (Sept. 14, 1960).
113 Ibid.
214 Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 7.02 (1958 ed.).
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Therefore the rule-making procedures, allowing the written submission of
views, were valid in the instant case because of the broad issue in dispute:
whether a blanket exemption was the most effective means of regulating a
character of operations which were peculiarly unsuited for regulation
under the certification procedures. Had the Board made the further de-
termination that a particular carrier, because of past conduct (an issue
which deserves a trial type hearing), would thereafter be ineligible for an
exemption, then the rule-making proceeding would be an inappropriate
means of regulation. Since the Board in effect made such a determination
in the Great Lakes case," ' the questionable nature of that decision is fur-
ther illustrated.
V. CONCLUSION: BALANCING PROCESS AND CONFLICTING IDEALS
A conclusion is necessarily predicated on the sum or perhaps the re-
mainder of the judgments made in the course of the paper. Therefore,
when it is submitted that the Great Lakes case ' was wrongly decided,
the Eastern,"7 Standard,"' and CapitoV'5 cases were correctly determined,
and the American Air Transport case2. requires further consideration,
ordinarily a conclusion could be written based on these judgments. But
a conclusion is only as valid as the theory which supports it, and a theory
explaining the exemption provision cannot be propounded on the basis of
the cases alone.
The cases correctly decided obscure the fact, and the case wrongly de-
cided makes too much of, the Congressional intent to give the Board a
much needed flexibility in the administration of air transportation by
conferring a broad exemption power on the agency. It is not a coincidence
that the three crucial elements of the exemption power-speed of ad-
ministration, broad use of discretion, and continued supervision of ex-
empt carriers-correspond very closely to the fundamental concepts which
underlie the theory of the administrative process.22" ' As suggested initial-
ly, 2 ' exercise of discretion under the exemption provision is perhaps the
"purest" form of agency power, and while this paper has focused on the
procedural problems which have arisen under the section, the important
role Section 416 has played in the development of air transportation should
not be obscured nor treated summarily.
The case which went the furthest toward granting exempt carriers
full procedural protection was American Air Transport, which conferred
licensee status on the complaining carrier. This case deserves further analy-
sis in light of the need to balance administrative flexibility against strict
procedural requirements; a need implicit from the tone of the preceding
paragraph and a need fairly drawn from the wide powers granted the
21s 294 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also note 184 supra and accompanying text.
216 Ibid.
217 185 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also note 109 supra and accompanying text.
21 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also note 130 supra and accompanying text.
219 209 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also note 209 supra and accompanying text.
226 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See also note 151 supra and accompanying text.
221 See Parker, Why Do Administrative Agencies Exist? A Reappraisal, 45 Geo. L.J. 331
(1957). The author examines the diverse and conflicting opinions held of administrative agencies
to determine if they conform to the actual operations of the agencies. The effort to discard the
myths and halos which surround the administrative process is an admirable one.
222 See Introduction supra p. 255.
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Board under 416. Speaking bluntly, should licensee protection be accorded
to carriers which hold authority under the exemption provision?
An affirmative answer will solve many problems, for issues of notice
and hearing can be resolved by referring to the Administrative Procedure
Act provisions regulating government supervision over license holders.
Yet to require the full procedural niceties contemplated by the Act would
largely vitiate the several advantages that the exemption section was de-
signed to provide: speed of administration and flexibility of control. The
granting of an exemption would become subject to added procedural con-
trols; the close supervision necessary over carriers otherwise free from
the restrictions of Title IV would be hampered by various procedural
technicalities; and of greatest importance, the exemption could not be
terminated, whatever the grounds," without an evidentiary hearing being
afforded each license holder. This would preclude the termination of
blanket exemptions by rule-making proceedings where no adjudicative
facts were in dispute. Indeed, if the licensing procedures are to be fol-
lowed with respect to exemptions, no substantial difference would then
exist between the authority exercised by the Board over the certified car-
riers and the procedures governing the non-certified or exempt carriers or
operations.
The opposite view to the license-status proposition is represented by the
rationale of the Great Lakes decision. That case appeared to draw its
reasoning from the earlier Eastern holding, which had ruled that the
unique character of the exemption provision militated against requiring
notice and hearing before the granting of an exemption. The Great Lakes
case, however, dealt not with granting but with terminating an exemption.
The later case, nonetheless, drew heavily on the privilege theory (with its
less strict procedural requirements) which had served as the basis for the
Eastern holding.
The Great Lakes' privilege argument follows, and it is certainly open
to question; because an exemption is deemed a privilege when granted it
remains a privilege throughout its employment and upon termination by
the agency the affected carrier enjoys no greater procedural rights than
he had at the inception of his authority. No other interpretation can be
drawn from the Great Lakes decision. The carrier, throughout its sixteen
years of service, operated at the "sufferance""' 4 of the Board, and was
subject to losing its authority without being granted an evidentiary hear-
ing on the facts upon which the agency based its decision to withdraw
the exemption. It is maintained that "[neither] the revocation require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act nor of due process were met" ''
in the Great Lakes proceeding.
The granting of an exemption is rather clearly a privilege. No judicial
enforcement lies to compel the Board to extend exemption authority to
any carrier, whatever the carrier's qualifications or needs."' But the
23 Excluding emergency or safety terminations.
124 Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
25 Id. at 228 (dissent).
'"Air Transport Associates v. CAB, 199 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (dictum). Note, how-
ever, that no other case has been unearthed where judicial enforcement of an exemption was even
sought, much less successfully obtained.
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Standard case.27 had held as early as 1947 that an administrative agency
cannot make an otherwise invalid proviso a condition to the grant of a
permit.22 s Once an exemption has been granted, the fact that it could have
been denied without a hearing does not mean that the agency has retained
the right to terminate the exemption without a hearing. Intervening con-
siderations come into focus, the most notable being the constitutional
prohibition against the taking of property without due process being
afforded the complaining carrier.
While property is not taken by the denial of an application for an ex-
emption, in most cases property clearly is affected when an exemption is
terminated after a decade of use by a carrier. "Nothing in the nature of
things requires that courts should refuse legal protection to interests that
have been in other contexts denominated privileges." '29 Professor Davis
further points out that "even if we fully accept the right-privilege dicho-
tomy, government disposition of issues concerning privileges or even
gratuities may affect rights, and therefore the courts may properly require
procedural fairness.""23 The Supreme Court's treatment of the privilege
doctrine in Slochower v. Board of High Education... is a clear demonstra-
tion of the court's willingness to subordinate the concept of privilege to the
needs of justice and sound policy.
Let there be no confusion here: the privilege concept is useful to decide
many cases, but it can serve to confuse an issue by providing only a label
to justify a predetermined conclusion. In borderline matters, and most
important questions arise in the shadow area, the essential issue is whether
the particular investment is worthy of judicial safeguards as represented
by greater procedural requirements. In the final analysis, the privilege con-
cept cannot support the Great Lakes decision because it is simply too un-
fair and burdensome, and hence violative of due process, to encourage a
private party to invest money and property over a period of years with-
out a guarantee that he will be entitled to an evidentiary hearing should
the government seek to terminate his operating authority.
Somewhere between the Great Lakes decision and the result in American
Air Transport, a middle ground must be reached. For while the latter
case would cure the defects of the former, it has been noted at numerous
points in the discussion that conferring licensee status on all exemption
holders would work too great an imposition upon agency procedures and
virtually negate the beneficial use of the exemption provision.
227 177 F.2d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
22 Citing FCC v. Sanders Radio Station (309 U.S. 470 (1940)). That case had held that an
existing radio station had a sufficient interest to obtain judicial review of an FCC order granting
the application of a new station to commence operations. The FCC had argued that the existing
station did not have a right to a hearing to protest the Commission's action, and therefore did
not have access to judicial review. The case was evidently cited for the proposition that the FCC
could not, as a condition of granting the original license to the existing station, bar that station
from seeking judicial review of subsequent Commission decisions which seriously affected the
interests of the existing station.
229 Davis, op. cit. supra note 214, at S 7.12.
215 Ibid.
23' 350 U.S. 551 (1952). In Slochower, the Court was faced with its previous decisions that
public employment is only a privilege and that "due process of law is not applicable unless one
is being deprived of something to which he has a right" (Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58
(1950), afirmed by equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951)). See also Adler v. Board of Edu-
cation, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). The Court nonetheless reversed, as violative of due process, the
discharge of a city college professor who had claimed the privilege against self-incrimination when
testifying before a Congressional committee.
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A. Suggested Remedies
1. The Administrative Court
The concept of an Administrative Court appears to be of little relevance
to the problems arising from the CAB's exercise of the exemption powers.
The Hoover Commission,23 which made a strong recommendation that
such a court be established, contemplated only a selective transfer of the
agencies' peculiar judicial functions to the Administrative Court" The
Commission urged the transfer of the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission to issue cease-and-desist orders under the Clayton and Federal
Trade Commission Acts, 2 34 and also the transfer of the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board to issue orders forbidding unfair labor
practices. On the Task Force, twelve of the fourteen members joined in
recommending that the NLRB's unfair practice jurisdiction be trans-
ferred 22 and all but five recommended that the Court be given jurisdiction
over cases involving exclusion, deportation, and incidental powers over
aliens. 20 Generally, the functions recommended for transfer as soon as
possible were the imposition of money penalties, the remission or compro-
mise of money penalties, the award of reparations or damages, and the
issuance of injunctive orders."'
Whatever the valid criticism leveled at the theory of an Administrative
Court,'2  a perfunctory analysis of the proposed scope of the Court leaves
little question that a function as singularly discretionary as the exemptive
power was not considered for transfer. While certain trial or judicial pro-
cedures are deemed essential where the revocation of a carrier's exemption
authority is based on adjudicative facts,3 2 forcing the Board to pursue a
full court proceeding to revoke, terminate, or modify an exemption
capable of being granted or denied with no restraints whatsoever, would
destroy the flexibility and speed of administration which are the inherent
attributes of the exemption power. It is submitted that the governing
philosophy of the Hoover Reports-"The more closely that administrative
procedures can be made to conform to judicial procedures, the greater
the probability that justice will be attained in the administrative pro-
cess"" -is simply too broad a generalization which fails to recognize many
of the beneficial characteristics of the administrative process; character-
istics which would be destroyed by judicialization, and which include the
exemption power discussed herein.
2. Rules of Evidence and Strict Procedures
The same destructive effect upon the exemption power would occur
should another suggested form of judicialization be introduced into the
administrative process. Reference is made here to the recent American
12 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, Commission Report
on Personnel and Civil Service (hereafter cited as "Commission Report"); Task Force Report on
Legal Services and Procedure (hereafter cited as "Task Force") (1955).
23 Task Force 242.
234 Commission Report 86.
.aa Task Force 280.
2 Id. at 269.
2
11 Id. at 242.
230 See e.g., Fuchs, The Hoover Commission and the Task Force Reports on Legal Services and
Procedures, 31 Ind. L.J. 1, 18-22 (1955).
239 See note 229 supra and accompanying text.
240Task Force 138 (Italics in original).
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Bar Association proposals"1 to require hearings generally to be conducted
in conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," ' and to isolate
the Hearing Commissioner from all agency and staff personnel."2 The
exercise of the exemption authority in particular, and of administrative
authority in general, is not amenable to strict rules of evidence and the
procedural technicalities normally associated with the judicial branch. Mat-
ters of national interest and the requirements of an interstate air transpor-
tation system do not lend themselves to cross-examination or to the
necessity of direct, rather than hearsay, testimony. The isolation of the
Hearing Commissioner in an exemption modification case such as Capitol,
2
"
and the requirements of the rules of evidence can only prolong a process
whose chief characteristic had been speed and flexibility.
As Fuchs has pointed out, the essential problem is to set the measure
of safeguards against unfairness and abuse in the agencies against the
danger of impairment of government effectiveness. 5 Indiscriminate over-
judicialization only weights the balance too far to one side, and as typified
by its probable effect on the CAB's exemptive powers, could lead to
strangulation of a process originally created to avoid the stringent require-
ments of the judicial concept. In terms of political theory, the administra-
tive process springs from the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of
government to deal with modern problems.2 1 If the experiment has failed
in terms of political theory, the failure should be met head-on and not
obscured by radically altering the original experiment to a point where it
will become unrecognizable.
The critical problem in the exercise of the exemption power was dis-
cussed at length in the Great Lakes analysis. 47 In the interests of speed
and efficiency, the Board sought to combine a broad rule-making function
with a particularized decision to terminate a carrier's exemption au-
thority. An Administrative Court solution to such a problem in ad-
ministrative law is the classic slaughter of an ant by the use of a steam-
roller. The remedy is simply not appropriate to the problem. While the
factors of time and space preclude further references to the administra-
tive process in general, the same inappropriateness of remedy is perhaps
characteristic of those proposals which seek to remove or compartmentalize
every vestige of the judicial process now existing under administrative
control.
Insofar as the Great Lakes issue is concerned, the ABA proposal to re-
define rule-making to exclude statements of particular applicability and to
refer only to statements of general applicability and future effect imple-
menting, interpreting, or declaring law or policy, u" would effectively bar
a second Great Lakes decision. The Board would be precluded, in a rule-
making proceeding, from making a determination on the merits of a par-
241 Contained in S. Rep. No. 1887, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced on May 16, 1961).
242 Section 1006(d) of the proposed Code.
243 Section 1005(c) of the proposed Code.
244 Capitol Airlines v. CAB, 292 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also note 209 supra and ac-
companying text.
241 Fuchs, The Proposed New Code of Administrative Procedure, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 423 (1958).
The author points out that in the past few years the trend has been towards increased government
effectiveness. He speaks approvingly of this trend, and notes that if it fails to continue a significant
impairment of government regulation will occur.
'" Landis, The Administrative Process (1938).
247 See Ch. IV D supra p. 287.
248 Section 1001 (c) of the proposed Code.
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ticular carrier's authority. In such an instance, administrative convenience
would bow to considerations of strict procedures and protection for the
individual carrier, but this does not endorse the proposition that an
Administrative Court provides the only solution to past agency failures
to protect individuals from procedural unfairness.
3. Davis: Limit Hearings to Adjudicative Facts
As suggested earlier,"' licensing all holders of exemption authority is
not an ideal solution, for the procedures envisioned by licensing would
rob the Board of its freedom of action under Section 416. But a closer
adherence to Professor Davis' adjudicative-legislative fact distinction would
provide the essential protection for individuals which basic due process
considerations demand. Agency decisions respecting facts peculiar to cer-
tain carriers are those decisions which must be preceded by greater pro-
cedural formalities than determinations based on general facts or policy.
The Board would thus remain free to terminate a carrier's or group of
carriers' exemption authority if the interests of national security or if the
total air transportation system so require, a power which would be denied
to the Board if exempt carriers were deemed license holders (absent ad-
judicatory hearing for each affected carrier). Yet so long as adjudicative
fact determinations are identified, sufficient protection is afforded from
unfavorable agency decisions based on the past conduct of a carrier or
on similar, personalized facts. A result such as Great Lakes would remain
unsupportable, as would the Board's decision in American Air Transport,
yet the vast apparatus of the judicial process need not be injected into the
administrative sphere.
B. Administrative Discretion: No Solution In Sight
By examining in some detail a singularly administrative function, the
elemental advantages and dangers inherent in the administrative process
have been brought into sharp relief. While it is true that the powers en-
joyed by the CAB under Section 416 are unique in several respects, it is
submitted that these powers embody the classic concepts of agency ex-
pertise and broad discretion which the administrative process was designed
to provide.
No other branch of government is equipped to administer a continuing
policy of regulation, promotion and supervision of one of the nation's
biggest industries, the air transportation system. The power to exempt
carriers from the initial legislative requirements is an integral part of the
process of governmental control in the public interest. The inability of the
legislature to supply continuing regulation is evident by its delegation of
power to an administrative body. To subject the nation's regulatory pro-
cess to the political vagaries of the executive branch has long since been
rejected in theory. The disadvantages, both in terms of policy and pro-
cedure, of ceding such authority to the judiciary are patent from the
prior analysis. The responsible exercise of administrative discretion remains
the only solution in sight.
249 See note 222 supra and accompanying text.
